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Transformation in Hungary and (in) Hungarian Economics1
1. Introduction and Methodology
It would be difficult to produce an overview of this subject in less than a monograph.
The first run in the library of the Budapest University of Economics produced over one
thousand entries of monographs and research reports on economic policy and economic
system only, excluding articles in scholarly journals, and studies published abroad in
collective volumes or journals. Thus the inevitable limitations of the time and subject
render this survey incomplete and selective, at times contestable for some. As even an
annotated list of bibliography of this size would be impossible to digest, our focus of
interest will impose severe limitations on the narrative. First, I shall abstract from what
is the numerical majority of the output, i.e. description and commentary of current
economic policies, contemporary developments and changes both in the real sphere and
in regulation. Second, I shall also abstract from the openly apologetic and also from
purely normative pieces, as well as from camouflaged lobbying and discourses over the
contemporary ideology, as on planning, entrepreneurial socialism (a form of third way),
socialist welfare, proportionality, international value, mathematical formalisation of
Marxian schemes, or interdependence. Third, I am forced to avoid reflections on the
emerging mainstream, which, owing to its very level of abstraction, could have little
bearing on systemic change. This is not to belittle this school, but the choice follows
from the task to be tackled. Fourth, I shall not deal with textbooks and sectoral
economics, with the partial exception of agriculture. The latter has to do with the
peculiar role this area played under goulash communism both domestically and in the
foreign trade of Hungary. Fifth, I shall have to abstract largely from what is my own
original field of interest, international economics. Thus I won´t touch upon the
literature on the energy crises, Comecon, EU, developing countries, or understanding
various theoretical schools and the practice in advanced economies, or of international
organisations. These will be included only insofar as these have had a direct bearing on
systemic change.
Thus what we offer here is not meant to be a comprehensive history of Hungarian
economics in the past two decades, but the history of policy relevant thinking, i.e. a
survey of that part of output, which has shaped the actual course of events. This
pertains both to policies and institutions, which are on their way to congruity to OECD
standards, and also to the schools of thought, that are becoming also increasingly akin
to what we can observe in developed countries.
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 Useful, comments, with the usual disclaimer, by L. Antal, T. Bauer, M. Bornstein, K. Lányi, P. Sutela, L.
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Budapest, which also covers the updated version of FIT Discussion Paper 96/1 by L. Szamuely.
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In methodological terms, I tried to survey published output, with monographs and
chapters in books as well as articles in periodicals taking precedence over newspaper
items and all other sources. If the piece was also published parallely in English, I quote
this source. However, normally it is the time of appearance inside Hungary which is
decisive, thus references are made to these. On certain occasions, some non-published
materials are also surveyed. These are needed for the better understanding of times,
when more often than not, only half of the sentence was uttered, and the other had to be
surmised by `those who had an ear to it´. As this piece is not historiography, but history
of thought, I did not attempt to process the archives in a systematic fashion, as those
ideas which never surfaced from the office shelves could, by definition, have little
influence over public perceptions of the economy.
Finally, the delineation in time needs clarification. The first attempt in the same genre
was the book by László Szamuely (1986), which published many previously
unavailable pieces and reprinted important contributions to the debates in the 1954-78
period. In many ways the present paper is a continuation of the introductory chapter of
this book, whose revised and updated version (Szamuely, 1996b) was part of the
present project. But not only my unwillingness to redo his job sets the time frame to
this study. 1978 was a year of a turn in the fortunes of Hungarian socialism. The outer
limits of the recentralisation of that decade were reached. The 1973-77 attempt to ward
off impacts of the oil crisis proved to be a dead alley. A year later, the second oil crisis
shattered remaining hopes of planners for an inward-looking strategy, based on
improved traditional planning techniques and more intra-CMEA cooperation. The
growth-oriented strategy, never questioned since the late 40s, had been confronted with
external and internal constraints. Externally, the Polish debt crisis and the second oil
price hike in 1979 together made the debt-financed strategy unsustainable. Internally,
the limitations of Soviet oil and gas supplies proved invincible. Thus the limitations
inherent in the policies and systemic options have come to the limelight.2
1978 was a year when the 1968 reforms were rehabilitated at the political level. The
internal dynamics of Hungarian politics in general and economic thinking in particular
would have required - and actually did call for3 - the radicalisation of reform attempts.
It would have included those areas, which were consciously exempted from the 1968
reforms: the priorities and orientation of economic policies, the institutional system, the
financial and foreign trade system, and last but not least, Party control of the economy.
Meanwhile, 1979 saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the collapse of the import-led
modernisation in Poland, having culminated in the insolvency of that country in April,
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 The collected essays of József Bognár (1976) played a pioneering role in spreading this conviction,
irrespective of some of its plainly erroneous theses, as the global shortage of energy or the rearrangement of
price relatives favouring primary products.
3
 The influential advisor, Bognár (1980 and 1982) called for changes in the model in precisely those elements
which under the NEM remained untouched: the institutional system, foreign trade orientation, and policy
priorities in a package. He was joined by other established figures like Nyers (1982), Berend (1982) or
Bródy, et al. (1984) calling for limited pluralism as a precondition for market reforms to make sense.
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1980. As the Solidarity period ended in the pre-emptive coup by General Jaruzelski in
13 December 1981, the geopolitical constraints on Hungarian reform dynamics had
become conspicuous. This explains the hysteric reaction of the authorities4 on the call
for a second economic reform that would have encompassed also ownership relations
(Bauer, 1982/84). The piece, written for, and accepted by, the official reform committee
(CCER, see below) can, with the benefit of hindsight, be taken for the blueprint of
actual changes spread across the 1980s. However, between the end of the Brezhnev era
(having proclaimed the dogma of limited sovereignty) and the beginning of the
Gorbachev era, making its qualities open in the Reykyavik summit of December 1985
only, several years elapsed.
During this period the Kádár leadership was cautiously balancing between the internal
and external exigencies. In Hungarian economic policies the termination of incremental
Soviet oil supplies in October 1979 triggered a strategic change, as a personally hurt
general secretary had given way to Hungary´s joining the IMF, thereby making the
country´s external dependence also formally bipolar. This turn, as could be documented
elsewhere (Csaba, 1995), has become instrumental in shaping the balance of forces
inside Hungary, turning them gradually in the favour of marketeers. Joining the IMF
was a last minute rescue operation for avoiding insolvency. In exchange, the IMF could
exert palpable - though by no means dominant - leverage over systemic change in the
country. This was formalised in a systemic matrix.5 This matrix contained a schedule
for coordinated systemic changes to be instituted in the 1984-87 period in finances,
taxes and import r´gime. Albeit the deadlines were finally not met, the propositions,
reflecting the Washington consensus, coincided with much of what autochtonious
Hungarian research had to offer (a point I shall document below). Therefore, with the
geopolitical constraints softening, the creeping reforms could, and indeed, did
materialise, implementing, by the end of the decade, actually much more than the
platform of the second economic reform had demanded.
In the following I shall describe the radicalisation of reform as a rejection of various
fundamental qualities of the status quo: planned economy, Comecon orientation,
selfsufficiency, the socialist qualities of the redistributory system, public property,
central allocation of investments, price and wage controls, state monopoly of foreign
trade and forex, and, last but not least, the reformability of the socialist model.
Following the experience of 1956, 1968 and 1981, most authors tended to focus their
criticism on particulars, not on the basics or the entirety of the system. However, both
the implications of these increasingly sweeping criticisms and the coordinated fashion,
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 The editor-in-chief of journal Ferenc Kulin was sacked, the author was publicly denounced, and each
official statement in the following three years have contained a dissociation from the idea of a second
reform. Still, the measures in 1984-87 and later in 1988-90 did add up to a second and even a third reform,
comparable to that in 1968.
5
 The document was first publicly mentioned in the article of Antalóczy and Kinczer (1995, 60-61); several
contemporary officials endorsed this piece of information on the public debate of the manuscript of the
article quoted above. The document itself is still classified.
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in which these could be articulated, have resulted by 1988 in a near consensus
professional view favouring a thorough overhaul of the model itself, i.e. systemic
transformation replacing socialist reforms. In the second part I shall survey reflections
on the vices and virtues of systemic change. In the third part I shall survey the reforms
already transcending, either by their substance or by their implications, the boundaries
of a(ny) market socialist model. Part four surveys the transition to capitalism and the
related debates. The fifth section depicts the return to the normalcy of capitalist
pluralism, i.e. a brief outline of the reemerging schools of thought is offered, while
concluding remarks put our narrative in a broader comparative perspective.
2. From Market Socialism to Market or Socialism
As documented in Szamuely (1996b), Hungary never had a strong tradition in market
socialism. Those advocating this type of solutions were mostly self-proclaimed
nonmarxists, as Istv”n Varga, B´la CsikÌs-Nagy, Jen˛ Wilcsek or JÌzsef Bogn”r, all
seeking a modus vivendi with geopolitical realities. This is an important difference to
most other Central European countries. The extraneous element has also been reflected
in the lack of theoretical generalisations of the Hungarian model.6 In fact, monographic
treatises of this genre were written mostly by those who have remained outsiders to the
given reform policies or periods. The first such attempt to generalise the 1968 model
was offered by Tamás Sárközy (1973), a professor of law, 15 years later himself a key
player in the reforms.
In a bulky volume published as late as 1979 a leading mind in Hungarian planning,
Ákos Balassa (1979, 16 and 54) argued for the cross-country validity of the indirect
planning model. However, at that time crisis management started to dominate all
formal(ised) decisionmaking structures (see below), thus the theory did not sound
convincing either domestically or internationally. Then Jen˛ B”rsony (1989), a teacher
of political economy (and a pedagogist by training) produced a more convincing case
for the same. A fourth such attempt was written retroactively by an Englishman, Nigel
Swain (1992), contrasting Hungarian experience with the idealistic suggestions of Alec
Nove on feasible socialism. Though many books and articles were written - also in
English - on Hungary, on the NEM and later reforms, only the above four monographs
attempted to offer a theoretical generalisation, while others consciously avoided any
such implication.7
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 This was not self-restraint, but one the few points where censorship was alert. Kádár drew the conclusion,
that the Prague Sping failed because of its universalist approach and aspiration to revamp socialism in
general, not only to improve conditions with in a Soviet sattelite. Beyond doubt, he would have had even
more difficulty in surviving the 70s, hadn´t he adopted this minimalist aproach.
7
 Several authors attempted to establish quantitative and/or causual interdependences on purely economic
grounds in explaining the reform cycles - in my view, without overwhelming explanatory power.
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This pragmatism had been symptomatic of Hungarian thinking and reflected the
compromise with the geopolitical status quo. The concept of economic mechanism had
helped to promote what Germans term Ordnungsdenken. However, as some of the key
policies were excluded from the areas open to publicly voiced criticism, the evolution
into what may correspond to Ordungspolitik was slow in the 1978-88 period. On the
other hand, avoiding the hot potatoes allowed much farther progress in understanding
the bits and pieces of a free market economy. This included the workings and meaning
of much of its institutional infrastructure by the late 80s, i.e. preceding political
changes. This has become manifest in the remarkable sustainability and stability of
reformist policies over and across frequent changes in the government in 1986-96. On
the level of theory the same is reflected in the sustaining neoliberal consensus on and
the simultaneous rejection of various alternative suggestions not only at the
policymaking level, but also in most of the profession. In many ways this is a sign of
pluralist maturity, reminiscent of most OECD countries.
The external constraints and shocks of the 1973-81 period have rendered macro-
economic planning an empty shell. Leading officials complained publicly about this.
The strong man of the planning board openly conceded the impossibility to manage the
economy through any sort of plan as well as their failure to relate plans with regulators,
or even to create a congruous policy mix that could have followed realities flexibly
(Horv”th, 1980, 4). The chief economic policymaker of the Party (also a theorist of
planning) rejected the idea of any longer range plan that could list all major policy
measures or quantify main processes or define structural changes; planning was seen as
a process of dovetailing competing claims for scarce resources (HoÌs, 1982, 1305-07).
This worldview was, of course, a far cry from the ideas of even revisionist market
socialists or even indicative planners. These reflect the rejection of planning even as a
serious legitimating principle or part of the ritual. It had become merely part of
geopolitical exigencies, even at the official (Party) level.
This final settlement of plan or market issue originated in a vast body of empirical
research, having confronted the contemporary ideology - favouring enlightened
indicative planning cum NEM in its original 1966 edition - with the realities of the 60s
and 70s. These analyses often consciously refrained from drawing the final conclusions
or from offering policy alternatives openly, however their message was fairly clear.
Analyses of the banking system (Huszti, 1980) in general and the investment sphere in
particular (De”k, 1978; Kazinczy, 1981) proved the continued predominance of central,
bureaucratic decisions, based exclusively on physical indicators or policy priorities,
rather than considerations of return or efficiency in major investments, subsidy and
credit allocations. This was though unsurprising in view of the totalitarian political
structure, but was at open variance with the self-proclaimed ideology of the NEM. The
latter has gradually developed into a main legitimating principle for J”nos K”d”r in the
period following the invasion of Czechoslovakia and again after the preemptive coup in
Poland. Likewise, profits did not orient investment decisions. Conversely, fiscal organs
F.I.T. Discussion Paper 6/976
„secured“ the nominal profitability of investments, based on development programmes.
According to KÌnya (1978, 104-6), 82 per cent of all investments were centrally
decided, even formally, whereas 83 per cent of profits derived from subsidies in 1968-
77. In a similar vein, Bartha (1977, 892) critically reported of the continued practice of
braking down sectoral targets on the formally independent decentralised corporate
sphere. Areas where competing projects could surface at all covered less than 10 per
cent of export-oriented investments (ibidem, 897). This was a far cry from the Brusian
idea of devolving all current affairs and minor investments (in fact most particulars) to
the company level, an idea that had laid at the heart of the NEM.
In theory, the 1968 reforms emancipated both the financial and the enterprise sphere
from the bureaucratic tutelage of the plan. In reality, fiscal practices continued to be
dominated by immediate policy concerns in more than one plane. As the monograph of
the later finance minister Mih”ly Kupa (1980) documented, fiscal authorities could
never counterbalance `planners` [which in practice meant the political leadership (the
Party centre)] when major decisions on development projects, major parameters of the
plan or economic policy priorities were concerned. On the contrary, by insulating
Hungarian markets first from the artificial intra-CMEA, later also from radically
changed world economic price signals, arbitraryness in fiscal management reached
unprecedented degrees by the turn of the 70s/80s. The monograph called for a major
change (diminishing) in the economic role of the budget, especially for the abolition of
income redistribution based on individual (corporate specific) deliberations and ones
due to price distortions and incomes policy.
As far as emancipation of companies was concerned, progress was limited to small and
medium-size firms. Central Party and planning organs continued to play an active role
in shaping enterprise plans and not only in intra-CMEA plan coordination. The planjury
was a formalised approval process of independent decisions of managers of larger units.
Furthermore individual orders and even allocation of scarce inputs, especially imports,
remained contingent upon Party interference; companies often themselves insisted on
the latter to minimise their risks (Lakos and J”nka, 1979, 144-147). Reflecting on these
distortions the earlier quoted volume of the coordinator of medium term plans called
for the abolition of sectoral ministries, rejecting administrative interference into
individual company cases, and tried to make planning meaningful by incorporating
each and every major investment decision into this process (Balassa, 1979, 106-111
and 116-119). This was, of course, naivity, as it stood in contrast to inherent features of
totalitarian polity and the resultant decisionmaking practice. The latter manifested itself
in informal braking down of plans (by making its computational material compulsory),
or the proliferation of central development programmes, rendering the concept of
„priority“ and „structural policy“ meaningless (op.cit. 168-9 and 207-214).
If a planner was, of course, unwilling to draw the final conclusion, other analysts were
no slow to make the remaining steps. Concluding his two volume monograph on three
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decades of socialist planning in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, the seminal
book of Tam”s Bauer (1981, 536-8.) proved convincingly: the unintended oscillation of
investment activity is no less inherent a feature of the command economy than the
business cycle is in market economies. Thus contrary to the postulates of Keynes,
Tinbergen and the various market socialists, governmental management of investment
decisions has resulted in more, rather than less, fluctuation in economic activity, more
rather than less waste of resources, less rather than more efficiency, measured at world
market prices.
This fundamental critique was reinforced by the parallely launched, though only five
years later completed and published volume of Soós (1986), having analysed the post-
reform Yugoslav and Hungarian economic systems in a comparative perspective. He
asked the question of efficiency of decentralising market socialist reforms, and raised
an issue that still counts among the evergreens of reform and transformation debates:
the interrelationship between institutional reforms and financial restrictions. Surveying
empirical evidence SoÌs (1986, 488-494) has found a strong positive correlation
between the two. He underlined the basically political nature of the oscillation between
pro- and antireformist cycles.8 He referred to several cases of retreat when only
intended, but actually never realised, radical projects were aborted by the pre-emptive
resistance of the totalitarian political superstructure. Thus he pinpointed the need for
open debates and making public choices in making the proreform line sustainable. He
also was the first highlighting the irreplaceable role of capital markets for fostering
sound and continuous readjustment of economic structures at the micro- and
macrolevels alike.9
Two fundamentally dissimilar analyses round up the economic thinking of the turn of
the decade. The book of J”nos Kornai (1980), Economics of Shortage has enjoyed
probably the largest international echo any Hungarian author of economics books ever
had. This had to do with the uniquely sophisticated elaboration of the subject by an
author, who has been familiar both with Western and Eastern economics. Inventing a
terminology of his own - thereby stepping into the footprints of the previous bestseller
of his, Anti-Equilibrium - Kornai had skilfully built a bridge between the two worlds.
By building up his theoretical construct from elementary phenomena, relying on daily
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 Tardos (1980a) also pinpointed the limitations of the NEM model, rather than to blame distortive
bureaucratic practices alone. He highlighted the lack of monetary integration within the regulated  model.
As long as 1 Ft of investment is not equal to 1 Ft of wages, central interference can`t be avoided. Individual
markets remained segmented also prior to the 1973 oil shock. Calculation schemes and ther controls ensured
the survival of the ratchet principle in regulation. Competitve pricing in 1980 imposed further constraints on
selfregulation and enhanced to importance of vertical dependencies/bragains, while did increase the role of
money (see below).
9
 Typically for the age and the atmosphere the official brochure (Hoós, 1980, 202-215) also goes out of way
in highlighting Tardos (1980a) also pinpointed the limitations of the NEM model, rather than to blame
distorive bureaucratic the limits to central controls, both of prices, of technological change and even of
international relations and their impacts on the planned economy. The auther also calls for a bankruptcy
mechanism to accelerate microstructural adjustment. It is remarkable how defetist this view was for an
ideologue of planning, in charge of the economic policy department of the Party centre.
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observations and Western economic concepts alike, Kornai has made the anti-
intellectual, linguistically and conceptually seclusive socialist economics accessible
also for the Western audience. He also had triggered a decade-long debate worldwide
on the explanatory power of his individual theses. All in all, the concepts of soft budget
constraint, shortage economy, monetisation and paternalism have all become parts of
the standard vocabulary. From our perspective the basic strength of the analysis was its
presenting the command economy as a logically closed system, where all subsystems
and phenomena depend upon one another. This is why partial reforms, as price
liberalisation, delegation of competences or reorganisations of various sorts were
shown to be by definition dead alleys. As precisely the latter were the hits of all the
socialist reforms of the 60s, the 70s and even the 80s, this was not an innocent message.
Kornai, at this point, avoided to make any allusion to economic policies or the political
superstructure. The latter two were commonly blamed for deficiencies. In so doing he
highlighted the deeply rooted structural causes for non-reformability. His concluding
cautionary remarks on the limitations of human deliberation against an institutionally
conditioned socio-economic environment make this plain, and the message was taken
in Hungary well beyond the economics profession.
In a completely different approach L”szlÌ Antal (1979) offered an original insight into
the entire NEM period. In this piece, originating from the mid-70s, Antal, an influential
insider of the Ministry of Finance, gave a detailed account of the emergence of a
bargaining society in the place of the enlightened absolutism of Oskar Lange and W.
Brus. Unlike Kornai, Antal stressed the fundamental role of the political and the
institutional system in reproducing patron-client relationships also in formally
decentralised areas. The nature of political hierarchies was blamed for omnipresent
economic irrationalities. If the description of Kornai was more in tune with standard
Western perceptions of the command economy, Antal highlighted the powers of
lobbying large enterprises and regional party organisations. His description was not one
of rulers and serves, but of a power game of intricate mutual dependencies and
vulnerabilities. In this game central organs were often being captive of the various
coalitions of vested interest (like regional, sectoral or ideological groupings).10 The
analysis of Antal, first withheld, later quoted more than any other piece inside Hungary,
was rather complementary than antagonistic to Kornai`s view. His broader approach
covering sociological and politological aspects made it more explosive in its
implications, but sounded more loyal from within the NEM ideological defenses. In a
multiactor game no player, not even the strongest, can be singled out to blame for all
shortcomings. And conversely in this view, waiting for a good government is no less in
vain than waiting for Godot.
It would, still have been misleading to take post-NEM Hungary as yet another
command economy. First, the very fact, that deeply critical analyses gained large
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Mancur Olsons book on the rise and decline of nations on the market was yet.
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publicity, thus influenced public perceptions seeing the status quo as grossly imperfect,
even disquieting. Second, the objective limits to any central control have come to the
fore. Third, the imperfections inherent in any reform socialist model were fairly clearly
stated. Last but not least, Hungarian reality, too, differed substantially from that in the
„fraternal states“. Not only in human terms - like availability of food, a relative
observance of privacy, or some travel possibilities - but also in terms of the economic
system.
1968 had made two giant steps, what the radical Gaidar government in Russia ventured
only as late as September 1992: it abolished compulsory indicators in toto, and it also
abolished centralised allocation of inputs. Thereby enterprise management was exposed
to the vices and virtues of independent decisionmaking in many walks of life. Most
products, problems, situations and financial regulators are too small and too numerous
to become subject to vertical bargaining: these had to be taken care of at the local level.
This has produced relevant changes in enterprise behaviour, rendering it quite
dissimilar to what conventional command economy microeconomics would have
suggested.
This finding sums up empirical microeconomic research, which has become a unique
and most productive field of critical Hungarian economics. Several authors,
disenchanted from, or by definition reserved against, official reform ideology, also
sceptical of the uses of improving the fundamentally wrong, produced several
interesting pieces describing Hungarian realities at the firm level, from the perspective
of entrepreneurs. In an important collective volume (Tardos, ed., 1980, / Hare, ed.,
1984) Hungarian researchers were highlighting the wide variety of behavioural patterns
that could be observed, which, itself, has been at variance with the uniform centrally
planned economy perspective. In the post NEM decade, various managers could opt for
competing strategies of success, from more patriarchal to more independent-minded,
more monopolistic or more competitive, Eastward- or Westward- looking. In many
areas and markets monopoly positions could be overcome, competition emerged and
corporate efficiency improved. In other cases countervailing strategies of insiders could
ward off these nuisances. Markets for inputs were gradually evolving. More
independence often implied more managerial effort to get into sheltered Comecon
markets, while getting rid of laborious and unrewarding Western sales. Large firms
were instrumental in shaping the contents of central development programmes and
intra-CMEA specialisation, formally managed by sectoral ministries. New freedoms of
auxiliary activities of co-ops also spread real entrepreneurial behaviour, whereas others
were successful in lobbying for more subsidies and for merging their subcontractors.
Deficiencies of the non-market allocation of investment resources were amply
documented, and the authors called for creating the comprehensive conditions for
devolution for awakening the entrepreneurial spirit.
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The plurality of successful entrepreneurial behaviour against a non-forthcoming
environment was a main finding of Kamilla L”nyi (1979) as well as of the monograph
on innovation (Laki, 1979). The focal role of state organs in major investments required
by major innovations was shown to have lead to a false feeling of security,
subsequently to failures in the real market environment. Competition, rather than
company size, was shown to foster innovation successes. The more the state
reorganised firms and introduced high-tech as part of its technology policy, the higher
was the probability of failure of the resultant new products in terms of sales. This
finding was an indirect proof of the advances made in actual managerial independence.
This managerial independence was portrayed in voluminous research highlighting
business executive overall dissatisfaction with the primitive intra-CMEA environment
with its hostility to innovation (Drechsler et al., 1983), its inherent inability to interfirm
cooperation (R”cz, 1982), and their resolute change in emphasis favouring Western
partners in orchestrating any major attempt to improve any aspect of their activity,
against the previous buffer role of the East (Szatm”ri and Muskovics, 1984; Inotai, ed.,
1984). Policies never encouraged such a change in functions: in fact, the latter had laid
the micro foundations for the cautious, but manifest, opening of Hungarian
macropolicies in the post-1982 period.
But the growth in freedoms had been perceptible also at the level of the individual.
Shortages were mild relative to those in fellow travellers, which enhanced consumer
sovereignty. The latter further increased with the financial restrictions surfacing in 1979
and in 1982-83, having lead to the sales difficulties referred above. The individual
could, and indeed, had to allocate his time increasingly according to his personal
preferences to overcome shortages and stagnant real incomes. The second economy,
first analysed monographically by G”bor and Galasi (1981) had become a mass
phenomenon. The latter has actually molded Hungarian society much more thoroughly
than reforms in 1978-87. Therefore it rightly has captured the attention of a growing
number of researchers. These often portrayed this area as one of emancipation from
governmental tutelage (which was only partly true, due to this sector`s symbiotic
relationship to the official economy). Some interpretations, as G”bor (1986) and Mizsei
(1987) went as far as portraying the second economy as the somewhat perverted
forefighter of capitalist freedoms in the command environment. This seems extreme,
due to the cultural, behavioural differences of a state-dependent subsector from a
dominant and independent enterpreneurship in the Weberian sense. But the style of the
controversy per se was a reflection of actual massive changes that have taken place in
the real and behavioural spheres alike. At this time, greengrocers closed down in
November in Czechoslovakia, and Andropov organised police campaigns against
speculators.
From the present fragmentary survey it should be equally clear why there was a strong
professional case in favour of a second economic reform by the early 1980s, and why
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the political leadership adopted a much more cautious line. When in 1978, and again in
1981, external constraints triggered financial restrictions, which normally bode well for
systemic change, the geopolitical situation, as well as fear from the Czech/Polish type
of political repercussions of economic reforms produced a hesitant, „conservative“
stance. With both the ideology and practice of macroplanning collapsed11, the only
wayout was the reintroduction as a state of emergency of a most simplistic form of
command management (as described in Csaba, 1983). This entailed an extreme form of
centralisation, with the governmental economic commission, headed by deputy premier
JÌzsef Marjai, completed with the international section of the National Bank, headed by
vicegovernor J”nos Fekete, and by the head of the economic department of the Party,
actually formed a trio overruling and dominating the entire formal decisionmaking
structure. Although influential analysts, like Tardos and Nyers (1979), Antal (1983) or
even HoÌs (1981) were no slow in highlighting the dangers inherent in this approach,
the short-term improvements in the current account seemed to have lent support to the
„firefighters“. With the benefit of hindsight critiques were clearly right in pinpointing
the dangers in having opted for systemically inferior solutions in terms of structure,
dynamics and lost opportunities alike. The situation, however, has helped discredit all
the remnats of planning ideology and of alleged superiority of policy-led adjustments.
This was the time when Kornai (1983) replaced the old plan and market dichotomy
with the apter bureaucratic versus market coordination. This formulation clearly
delineated ideological aspirations from power-centered reality.
The article and the concept was instrumental in explaining the vices of the much
debated competitive or world market price system in Hungary. This arrangement (for
details see the book of CsikÌs-Nagy, 1980a) aimed at enforcing international price
relatives, especially high external energy prices, in an artificial fashion, through
centrally prescribed calculation schemes. Unsurprisingly, the goal was not met, while
the previously second rank price office gained prominence against other departments in
the bargaining process with enterprises (Antal, 1982). But over and above the
bureaucratic intrigue, Hungarian profession was from the very outset (e.g. Hoch, 1979)
convinced of the vices inherent in any artificially imposed scheme, calling it a step
behind the 1968 practices, even though it happened in the name of the most enlightened
ideology.12 Kornai`s new terminology thus formulated a key quality of the market as a
spontaneous order (in Hayekian sense). Thus Hungarian theorists ceased to think of any
optimal project or design, which later also molded the Hungarian controversy on
privatisation, making it so distinct from similar debates in other transforming countries.
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 Empirical research has also highlighted: the plan has lost its relevance as a main decisionmaking and
iterest coordination mechanism well before the extremist crisis management scenario. The close-to-official
Román (1980) complained: while plans should check the consistency of major investment decisions, the
latter are taken even vertical bureaucratic bargains in shaping both form and contents of structure forming
investment programmes. Others (Schweitzer, 1981) pinpointed: these bargains finally do accomondate all
those interested, „only“ points of innovation, efficiency and competitiveness suffered from the nature of
decision-making.
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 Which was, in the view of the architect, Csikos-Nagy (1986 p. 76) the Lange-Lerner model. Hungarian
experiece proved the limits of any such simulation-as retrospectively himself concluded.
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With the imminent crises - current account and geopolitical - gone, the13 leadership
gave in to some reforms in 1983. This gave food for thought for dozens of actively
hundreds of indirectly involved economists to reflect upon the type of market they are
after and ways of transition to their target model. It allowed for confronting various
ideas, options, contrasting these in public, and to some extent influence the course of
events, and thereby receiving a feedback.14
Interestingly, in contemporary official thinking the state of emergency enjoyed much
more sympathy than one could have assumed. Official thinking seem to have been
convinced by the radical improvements in the current account, whereas the complaints
on the growing dynamic and structural costs tended to be belittled as abstract
theorising. Typically, both command methods and a deteriorating export structure were
presented as acceptable short-term costs, with not a single word uttered about dynamic
efficiency (HoÌs, 1984, 116-120 and 162-3). Other officials also took it for granted that
economic disequilibria, especially in the current account, do justify delays in more
radical reforms (CsikÌs-Nagy, 1984). This is not only about the inverse of what later
was known as the Washington consens and the contemporary recommendations of the
IMF, but is reminiscent of the debates in the post-Soviet area a decade later.
This was all the more disquieting as arbitrary „operative interference“ by Party and
state organs and their reliance on command methods tended to become a standard
practice across-the-board, also in areas previously not considered to be prime subjects
to such influence. The latter included industrial cooperatives (Laki, 1983) agriculture
(Hanyecz, 1982) and - last, but not least - foreign trade (G”cs, 1986). This had nothing
to do with the culmination of the indirect system and the victory of bureaucracy
operating it (R´v´sz, 1988, 669-670). On the contrary, this added up to a complete
revoking of the liberties granted by the NEM, both from most of the formal rulers
(bureaucracy) and from the ruled, who were not supposed to obey to any informal
pressurizing. Actually, the vast majority of bureaucracy must have felt emasculated by
all or most of its powers taken over by a central gang, not legitimised by any rule or
procedure. This also explains why so many departments, previously hostile to
marketeer ideas, like that of planning or foreign trade, tended to espouse them. This is
why thinking and talking (if not acting) neoliberal has gradually become the fashion in
most of the state administration, especially, though not exclusively, among the younger
and the better trained. This rather widespread change in the mood explains much of
how both reform ideas and reform policies could be radicalised under an increasingly
senile political superstructure. The latter background should always be kept in mind
when evaluating the ideas discussed below.
                                                          
13
 With the death of Brezhnev, power struggles in the Kremlin erupted, and Andropov sounded reformist.
Meanwhile in Poland General Jaruzelski introduced a reform, which looks timid from today`s perspective
but was more radical than any of its predecessors. Kádár was thus counting on a reformist trio to emerge
and avoid isolation within the bloc.
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 As documented in Antalóczy and Kinczer (1985) and Csaba (1995).
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Authorities felt quite confortable with a chaotic system, whose rationality and
„Salonf‰higkeit“ was less than trivial, as long as it was delivering a satisfactory
performance on the current account. Meanwhile, the economics profession was
decreasingly convinced of the thesis seeing monetisation as the centerpiece of the
whole reform, rather than devolution of authority (CsikÌs-Nagy, 1980b). No serious
analyst has even condoned the status quo or suggested a reversal to the practices of
other socialist states. The question was only: through what way, to what market? The
more general answers were given in works by Tardos (1982), Bauer (1982) and Antal
(1982), with their call for a second, more radical reform, rolling back the state and
extending market coordination to capital allocation, valuation of corporate assets and to
foreign trade. Each of these went much farther than the original NEM project of 1966,
as economic policy, foreign trade and the institutional system were all encapsulated in
the new platform. While representatives of this line of thought were banned to small
circulation journals, whose editors were often harassed or even persecuted, the Institute
of Economics was commissioned to elaborate a comprehensive reform programme (IE,
1983), and the coordinating committee on economic management (CCEM), an
interdepartmental organ directly supervised by the economic section of the Party,
continued to discuss intensively radical projects to be legislated from 1984. The latter
provided stimulus to researchers and the thus induced dynamic thinking proved more
important than the actual policy outcome, and never ceased, not even after the
promulgation of one or another measure.15
The IE project launched an all-out attack on discretionary decisionmaking, both in the
form of „operative interference“, orders, phone calls, as well as in the more traditional
form of individualised, company- and sector- specific regulation, as practiced in 1968-
78. It declared the principle: in the competitive sphere only self-regulation of market
forces is acceptable, without any ifs and buts. It called for a simultaneous liberalisation
of imports and prices rather than to wait for equilibrium to be restored first through
commands. It called for investments to be allocated following profitability, via
decentral decisions of firms, for abolishing wage controls and also for the emancipation
of the private sector, not only of coops. Demonopolisation of home and external trade
was urged, while noting: freedom of entry for new agents is more relevant for a market
orer than any administrative chopping put of large firms. This is a particularly
important point in view of the deconcentration campaign of the mid-80s, which gave
food for thought for several analyses (see below). Similarly, the pressure for exit was
also highlighted, as this allows for the market to clear: thus bankruptcy is far more
important than the creation of any optimal industrial pattern.16 Analysts of the Institute
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 This internal dynamism was, in my view, somewhat downplayed in the famous survey article of Kornai
(1986), having confined itself to a selection of the published output. The latter, being only a tip of the
iceberg, was therefore rightly blamed for not facing the underlying structural and functional constraints,
inherent in any market socialist reform project. The lure to offer something marketable, of course, enhanced
analyst`s willingness to put up with political realities of the day.
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 By proving the impossibility of defining this target, the book of Schweitzer (1982) gave a lasting critique
of both earlier centralisation and (later) deconcentration campaigns, conducted by a central agency
(including the privatisation agency).
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also called into question the rationale of (limited) self-management for enterprises, as
this was shown to be in conflict with the function of maximising asset value, as well as
with capital reallocation according to considerations of recoupment.
Policymakers rejected most of the substance of the IE paper, retaining only some of its
language. Contemporary adherents to the upcoming self-management school (Csillag,
1983), coming from the young Turks of the Ministry of Finance underlined: in the lack
of a capital market only a social counterweight can protect management against
bureaucratic arbitraryness17, whereas state holdings tend to be misused by bureaucratic
and political special interest groups. The victory of the latter consideration has become
a source of dysfunctions by the end of the decade. True, such institutions, policies and
processes emerged in the following years that none of the theorists of the early 80s
could have visualized; these have certainly changed the contextual relevance of
individual options.
The final edition of CCEM reform blueprint (GadÌ and Varga, eds., 1984) was a
serious disenchantment reflecting the all-out counterattack from the ideological wing of
the party (Kozma, 1982), as well as the antiinflationary concerns voiced recurringly by
its general secretary. The compromise, struck for the April 1984 central committee
meeting proved much too elaborate, leaving all sides equally dissatisfied with the
outcome. The more general part of the project (esp. 83-91) was a rehash of the old
regulated market model, where market is a mere instrument, and major investment
decisions are only influenced, not however guided by its feedbacks. This was, of
course, an extremely backward position for contemporary standards. To illustrate this
point, let’s suffice to quote the always circumspect insider CsikÌs (1983, 730), who
cautions against price liberation, does not see trade liberalisation possible, but finds it
absurd if investments continue to be allocated along technical-economic criteria. This,
as seen above, reflected a professional consensus. It was a weak counterweight in the
CCEM project (286) to state that centralised investments, too should follow the
profitability principle, in the spirit of Lange. Both in home and external trade a very
restrictive stance prevailed, justifying quotas, orders, administrative interference of any
sort. Centrally set prices still covered nearly the half of all prices, and bureaucratic
wage controls remained in place. Most „progressive“ elements in the CCEM blueprint
served to curtail current fiscal spending, while leaving most systemic features intact.
Three areas indicated some progress. 1. Banking reforms were launched, by accepting
the model of a two-tier banking and parliamentary control over money supply targets,
to be elaborated by the central bank. 2. The idea of maximising asset value (105-6) first
ever emerged in an official document. 3. Formation of enterprise councils, with the
election of managers, was approved.
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 It is important, that in Hungary there was no strong theoretical backing for the idea of pure self-
management, given that autochtonious socialist movement has remaind so weak. The only serious
proposition in this vein, that of the Workers Council of Greater Budapest of 1956 was aborted (PetÎ and
Szakács, 1986, 343-368). Adherents to this concept in the 80s used it merely as an instrument fighting
omnipotent state bureaucracy, i.e. took it as a means, not as an end.
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All in all, where it did signal change, the CCEM remained vague and the April 1984
Party decision18 signalled a stalemate in all issues except point 3. This has stimulated
further activities, as also stipulated by the decision itself.19
This strange deal was well reflected in a position paper by the two leading personalities
of the CCEM, Pulai and Vissi (1984), highlighting a new medium-term reform project.
This contained important deadlines - as 1987 for the introduction of a conceptually new
system of taxation, similar to that of the EC countries. Furthermore it contained
important new elements going way beyond the confines of the CCEM project, dated
only 6 months before. This included a demonopolisation drive, delineation of legal,
market and ownership control, as well as adversing the issue of capital market.
It would be hard to comprehend this swift change of mind without the widespread
feeling of a crisis. This had to do with the loss of perspectives, which was a writing on
the wall for a r´gime which had pacified its citizens via buying them out through
constantly, though modestly growing living standards. And 1984 was already the sixth
meagre year. Were there new growth prospects around, a sigh a relief could well have
been heard. But this was not the case. The chief planner (HoÌs, 1984, 16) was quite
plain in stating: recovery of domestic demand could not be expected before the 1990s.
This meant the drying up of the base for the post-1956 social compromise.20 Others
(Nyers and Tardos, 1984) contended: there was an alternative, had systemic reforms
proceed more radically, than envisaged in the CCEM paper. This, however would have
called into question „proven“ ways of controlling societal consequences of economic
processes, like price and wage controls, entry and exit of firms, the monopoly of
foreign trade and centralised money management. But this was precisely what J”nos
K”d”r disliked the most. Inflation in 1945-46 and massive dislocations under R”kosi
were to be avoided, irrespective of, the ways and means this could be achieved.21 But
unlike in 1956, this time the Soviet Union was of no help, even in perspective, as
Hungary´s chief negotiator stated quite plainly following the failed Comecon Summit
(Party, 1984). The circle was thus closed, which opened the gate wide for airing
previously unshakeable reform ideas on the domestic front, whatever Moscow thought
about them. The latter was a true novelty vis-à-vis the practices of the preceding forty
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 English version available in Acta Oeconomica, 1984/1-2
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 The final version of the „old“ one (Pulai and Vissi eds., 1985), explaining and commenting what
materialised of the (Gado and Varga, 1984) volume, was therefore out of date at the time of ist release.
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 This finding has decisively molded the contemporary felling of crisis. The minister for plaining, not
belonging to the reformist camp, himself put it in terms of dilemmas between growth and equilibrium,
structural change and scarce investment, decontrol and manageability (Hoós, 1988). Unsurprisingly, he
called for more vigorous structural policies as a wayout, thereby disregarding both the decay in political
structures and the quite important new findings of contemporary critical economics, as his optimal wayout
was already closed. Meanwhile, as Béljácz (1986) rightly pointed out, centralisation in actual investment
decisions even increased, as financial restriction imposend irrealistic (30-40 perecent) annual return
requirements on enterprise inverstments, not supported by central preferences of any sort.
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 A participant recalled the April 1983 meeting of the CC, when Kádár noted „Comerades, you must have
misunderstood the task. What you suggest would mean that the market dictates prices and we adjust. No
comerades. We pay you, to deliver us the prices which get our policies through!“
F.I.T. Discussion Paper 6/9716
years. Thus fairly direct criticism proliferated and spread over previously forbidden
areas.
The fundamentals of economic policies were often questioned in the literature on
foreign economic relations (see below). However, the book of B´la K”d”r (1984)
questioned the rationale of contemporary policy priorities in toto, when it proved:
security of supply considerations, priorizing the primary sectors, while aiming at
technological invulnerability were all at odds with main tendencies that could be
observed in successfully adjusting developed and developing countries. He was
highlighted the relevance of joining in the multinational inter - and intrafirm networks,
especially in technologically more advanced subsectors, both for R+D, product
development and for market entry. This added up to a full-fledged horizontal critique.
In a much quoted monograph, L”szlÌ Antal (1985a) synthesizing his previous findings
came to a fully-fledged vertical critique of economic policies. He talked about a
regulatory illusion (146-166) reigning among those on the commanding heights and
highlighted the role of invisible, interest-related mechanisms of decisionmaking. In the
second part he viewed the model of NEM basically as an illusion, where some
softening up occurred, but the major principles - like tying incomes to profits, or
applying generally valid financial rules - proved to be impractical. Plan-bargaining was
substituted by bargaining over financial conditions. In the third part he identified the
minimising of strains and frictions, rather than any idea or model as the „Leitmotiv“ of
the system, where restrictions only breed new restrictions, and even the remands of
rationality is lost. With no increments to be redistributed, economic policy has reached
its outer limits, as there was no room left for it to influence actual processes in any
significant way. This rounded up the view of a dead alley, with the system heading for
implosion, without any external influence, following its own logic.
What Antal presented as a postulate, Szegv”ri (1988a) established as empirical
evidence. Analysing the 1979-86 period he talked about an implicit economic policy to
denote actual priorities, which were only loosely related, if at all, to formalised
procedures, plans, policy documents and other fancy inputs of classical Sovietology
(later transitology). The complete decoupling of formal and real powers and policies,
the growingly irrelevant regulatory and policyforming rituals, as observed by an insider
of the supreme planning organ, were clear signs of decay in the macrostructures of
overripe socialism. When objectives and outcomes are not even loosely related, it does
not take a Gorbachev to get an implosion at any moment, provided external military
suppression is not imminent. The Jaruzelski coup had already indicated Moscow’s
limited ability and willingness to intervene. This was reinforced in the post-Reykjavik
phase and became irrevocable, owing to the simultaneity of erosion and crises saddling
both the internal and external Soviet empire. As Szegv”ri convincingly documented,
not even the supreme/sole priority of acceptable current account performance could be
sustained, as external financial disequilibrium was immediately reproduced, and even
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worsened, at any time the government only thought of steering some growth in the
stagnant economy.
In this overall looming of crisis, analysts turned in part to empirical research, as quoted
above, in part to elaborating what a well functioning market economy would require in
concretu. This produced a variety of pieces in the middle of the decade. A later minister
of finance, writing together with later governor of the central bank offered a parallel
historical and logical overview of the evolution and role of money and market in the
modern economy (Bokros and Sur”nyi, 1985). This was an attempt to address the ways
and means of overcoming an institutional and structural crisis, which they took as a
starting point. The historical survey proves the qualitative superiority of market as a
coordination mechanism against any other, especially bureaucratic, forms. The second
part addresses what the authors hsaw as a fundamental flaw for a market economy:
inflation. They severed the conditions of Kupa (1980) highlighting the rigidity of any
fiscal commitments and disputing the existence of a „natural“ deficit, which could and
should be tolerated, (280-289) as it is likely to produce only higher inflation, not more
marketable output. Therefore a restrictive (neutral) monetary stance is a precondition
for external equilibrium to sustain, and adjustment to accelerate. Their concluding
chapter (319-328) highlighted the dire need for financial institutions able to promote
self-correcting adjustment both at the enterprise and in the monetary spheres. In an
important peculiarity, the authors` fight against centralised price and wage fixing,
calculation schemes and the like did not lead them, as most contemporary reformists, to
a lenient stance on inflation, as an inevitable by-product of structural changes.
This call also helped a better delineation of the monetary and fiscal spheres as well as
the respective policies. Analysts of the Institute for Financial Research (Asztalos, et al.,
1984) highlighted the need to regulate macrodemand through money supply, which, in
turn, presupposes an independent central bank. Only asset value maximising, freely
operating financial institutes, not serving fiscal or sectoral purposes may qualify as
commercial banks. These steps require that no physically predetermined plan or
developmental project be automatically financed, and that legislation could set limits to
the monetary financing of fiscal deficits. Only if all these conditions are met, can
commercial banks compete and operate on the business principle.
But this line of thinking had to be generalised and extended well beyond the financial
sector. Not only financial institutions but the entire corporate sector has to adopt the
function of asset value maximising, which is quite unlike profit maximisation year by
year, as stipulated by the NEM model (Antal, 1985b). In this line of thought there’s no
sense to delineate running and structure- determining decisions, i.e. the foundations for
centralised investment management are gone. This leads not only to the question of
freedom of entry, an issue basically accepted in the contemporary official vision of a
multisector economy, but that of exit. In theory, there’s nothing easier for a totalitarian
state than to close down any economic unit. However, in Hungarian post-NEM reality,
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with the resurgence of the idea of corporate independence, this time supported by
elected enterprise councils from 1985, closures were practically nonexistent. Thus
small wonder if official working documents of the CCEM openly discussed Western
style bankruptcy arrangements as a means to manage enterprise crises in a decentral
manner (Matolcsy 1984). The idea of creditors enforcing the liquidation of their
hopeless debtors emerged. Analysts of the National Bank (J”nossy, 1985) seconded by
highlighting: unless the need to retain liquidity, at any rate, becomes the supreme
maxim for managers, there will be no pressure to divest and reinvest, i.e. for structural
change undertaken for microeconomic considerations. Experts of the ministry of
finance called for setting up reorganisation agencies, specialised on dealing with the
problem firms (Asztalos, 1985). Unsurprisingly, legal experts were no slow in
elaborating a bankruptcy legislation modelled on the rather soft West European
procedures (T˛r˛k, G. 1985). The law took effect from August 1986 and influenced
mostly the small and non-state firms. Dramatic market clearing has not taken place
(similarly to posttransformation experiences in many other countries). Authorities
tended to discourage any such case that would have involved larger units, or on
occasion, they positively bailed out large „political“ firms. This notwithstanding, the
public perception and also the bargaining position of the latter were seriously shaken by
the adverse publicity surrounding the bailouts, and discussions over who actual pays
the bill intensified.
3. Reforms beyond Socialism
From the mid-80s the Hungarian economic thought evolved in four main directions,
covering the organisational system, financial sector reform, property rights and foreign
trade orientation.
A. The organisational system remained one of the taboos in the post-NEM period.
Furthermore it was common knowledge that the monopoly system, created by the 1962-
64 centralisation campaign had been a serious impediment to any market-type
behaviour. Large firms and sectoral ministries were rightly seen as the driving force
behind the recentralisation tendencies. This notwithstanding, except for marginal steps,
like merging the three industrial ministries into one department in 1980, or merging the
external and home trade ministries in 1986, not much has happened. As the
contemporary (best-seller) account of an insider, Tam”s S”rk˛zy (1986) explained in
detail, two major trends of thought emerged in the reformist camp. One - including
Sárk˛zy - saw sectoral organs and party control as the larger evil. In order to restrain
this by a centralised functional governmental pattern, it was ready to compromise with
socialist industrialists. The other, mostly rallying around the minister of finance Istv”n
Hetényi, tried to brake the backbone of the lobbyists first and foremost, therefore they
supported financial sector reform and small-scale enterpreneurship.
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The second line of reasoning very strongly capitalised on the aforementioned trust-
busting ideas of the CCEM and initiated a centralised deconcentration drive against the
large conglomerates. Whereas the first group were thinking of a Treuhand-model, i.e. a
ministry or a national property fund, the second supported small business and
deconcentration, i.e. competition from below. Whereas the first group saw
concentration as an objective trend of modern organisation in any sector, the second
(Csillag and Lengyel, 1985) highlighted the role of small business and competition,
both for societal and economic considerations. This was a clear break with the NEM
having tolerated auxiliary activities of coops, or even with its 1981 edition tolerating
the same for industry and services: it was a call for new and potentially dangerous
entries. The above quoted volume was quite critical of intra enterprise partnerships
(vgmk) for their having been integrated into socialist hierarchies. This was an important
change in emphasis at a time when already 4 mn people were involved in small scale
private activities, and only half of them in agriculture; the lack of competition (as well
as the artificial benefits provided via taxes) was clearly distortionary (R´v´sz, 1985,
96).
The organisational system has thus had a good reason to become the hit of the mid-80s.
Detailed multiyear analyses22 produced fairly strong evidence calling for
deconcentration as a precondition for market regulation to make sense: from retail trade
(Karsai, 1988) to trade in intermediary goods and inputs/wholesale trade (Köbli, et al.,
1986) and even in the previously sacrosaint foreign trade (Pete, 1984; SalgÌ, 1989).
These more technical arguments were supported by sociological research, having
highlighted the active, but harmful, role of the large socialist firms in setting actual
investment priorities (Szalai, 1981), and in creating an unhealthy stalemate thwarting
any major reformist endeavour (Voszka, 1984).
Therefore, summing up a nation-wide research having produced no less than 234 longer
studies Sipos and Tardos (1986) also called for changes in this area, as they saw the
organisational system as the major impediment to market-type behaviour in all sectors
and in all property forms. They blamed this for restrictive financial policies (in 1979-
84) not having brought about restructuring, needed for a new growth path. They also
underlined: unless asset value maximising and bankruptcy orientate firms, devolution
of authority breeds only more inflation, not more efficiency (a point later frequently
raised - Western theorising on reforms).
The reformist part of the government translated these findings into policies, which
attacked the ossified trust organisation both from below (via bankruptcy legislation and
the enterprise councils) and from above (by administratively chopping up large firms
and encouraging secession by remote plants or certain viable organisational units). This
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idea - later also advocated as a precondition for viable and efficient privatisation
(Newbery, 1991) - proved to be a complete failure. Not only because of foreseeable
resistance by adversely affected groups, which included sectoral ministries, regional
(party) organs, unions and even intra-Comecon clients. Not only because of the
centralised polity’s propensity to comfortable organisational patterns and the avoidance
of conflicts as the superb maxim of the late K”d”r era. Empirical analyses of the
process (Voszka, 1988; Vince, 1987) have highlighted the fundamental arbitraness of
any central(ised) decisionmaking over microeconomic issues. In other words, reformist,
enlightened bureaucrats couldn’t but take equally silly decisions lacking concrete
microeconomic justification, in terms of efficiency and for maximising asset value, as
could old-fashioned adherents of the status quo ante. This evidence may explain why
calls for more active industrial policies under weak markets found next to no echo in
the 1990s.
But at the time, the failure of deconcentration gave birth to a (still popular) theory of
extreme viability of intertwined structures of polity and economy, which formed a
backbone of ruling hierarchy, and in turn molded any reform rather than let itself be
retailored in a typically constructivist manner (Szalai, 1989). In hindsight, this approach
underestimated the political nature of fundamental vertical dependences, having
dominated under the socialist model - a point very convincingly made by the grand
retrospective economic analysis of János Kornai (1992) and the political scientist M”ria
Csan”di (1995). Meanwhile Szalai seems to have overestimated (or overgeneralised)
the stalemate typical of the late K”d”r period. In addition, the international - imperial -
dimension was left completely out of sight.
The failure of the deconcentration drive of the mid-80s, thus proved both the
complexity of economic order, far exceeding any of its important constituent, as well as
the limits to human deliberation and design in shaping a spontaneous order in detail.
Thus it is unsurprising that a further radicalisation of reform projects spread over to
politically sensitive areas, as the capital market, property rights and foreign trade
orientation, thereby calling into question the entire raison détre of the socialist model as
a systemic totality.
B. In the second area, financial sector reform progress was rather quick, self-propelling
and linear. Banking reform and much of the institutional changes, that make monetary
policy meaningful, was accepted in the ever more forthcoming official stance. As the
1984-85  growth acceleration attempt was in definance of both the IMF and domestic
reformists, the collapse of this course by 1986 had automatically strengthened both
camps. Authorities had to be more attentive to IMF advice, and these were asking for
the measures listed in the 1984 matrix, referred above. Meanwhile the previously
surveyed domestic analyses also were stepping up pressure to proceed with financial
sector reform as the only way to improve allocative efficiency, and generate growth
under severing external constraints.
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Following the turns and twins of bureaucratic infights (on these cf. Antal and Sur”nyi,
1987) and overcoming the resistance of the central bank, a two-tier banking system was
introduced, by delineating the sectoral directorates of the National Bank and turning
them into three independent financial organisations. As the contemporary description
(B”cskai, 1989) indicated, these were burdened with old debts and forcibly allocated
clients, heavily undercapitalised in terms of infrastructure and human resources, and
operating in a less than free price system distorted by proliferating subsidies.
Unsurprisingly, architects of the change (Bokros, 1987) were quite clearly stating:
conditions for business-like behaviour have not been created, as guidelines for credit
policy continued a practice of indirect braking down of plans, whereas the very act of
`censoring` credit requests would exclude the enforcement of governmental preferences
and maintenance of a pre-set clientele. Representatives of the central bank were no
slow to respond: this reform fell short of creating the conditions for a truly independent
monetary authority, and the new banks couldn’t operate as money managers either
(BÌdy, 1988). Macroanalysts blamed not only the half-heartedness of the organisational
measure, but highlighted the lack of two further conditions: an interest in asset value
maximising - i.e. private property - both in banks and in the corporate sector, and the
lack of a real capital market (Tardos, 1987).23
This rounded up the transition from an ever more radical socialist reform to a model of
private capitalism with no governmental control over resource allocation at the
macrolevel. This finding was supported by a monographic description of the post-
reform bank and credit system in Hungary, blaming it for the lack of long term capital
allocation mechanism (except for the plan) (Antal and V”rhegyi, 1987). The latter, in
turn, explains the institutional rigidity of supply in the longer run. The book offered a
detailed list of the variety of methods how the function of profit (recoupment)-oriented
capital reallocation was about to be substituted in the Hungarian practice in 1967-87 in
vain. Simultation proved to be a dead alley (and this equalled to the death sentence of
any form of market socialism).
If no capital market exists, state (administrative redistribution remains the sole means
of capital allocation - and this was experienced to be inevitably distortive and lacking
efficiency. Thus there remained no room for the state to be rolled back. Growing
decentralisation of decisions was no answer to this dilemma: it only aggravated
macrostructural strains; while demand management remained the job of fiscal policies
(and could only be performed poorly). Actually, this was the time when the need for a
thorough  budgetary reform became public (Het´nyi, 1988a). The analyses indicated the
state-owned sector´s functioning with regularly lower efficiency in each and every area,
further it criticised the excessive share of economic outlays in total fiscal spending.
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 In turn, real (private) banking and a capital market condition a banking system which is a far cry from what
the 1987 bank reform delivered: the contextual change would have justified a second, much more radical
banking reform (Asztalos, 1988), which, actually, never materialised. Instead, centralised bailout procedures
(first companies later of banks) tried to address this issue (see below), as long as the 1996 privatisations
settled this issue.
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This, of course was only one step from first calling for, later creating, a capital (stock)
market (J”rai, 1989).
C. It is in this context that the obscure scholastics of previous decades on the property
issue have gained in significance. Under the geopolitical constraints of Hungary both
private property and real selfmanagement were non-starters. Meanwhile, debates over
coops and small business often were sheer reflections of contemporary Soviet
vigilance, or worse, of counter-productive activities of police organs. With the
introduction of enterprise councils in 1985, bankruptcy legislation in 1986 and
commercial banking in 1987, ownership developed into a serious issue, affecting power
and the rules of the game.
The internal logic of theoretical evolution coincided with the geopolitical emancipation
of the country way above the level conditioned by the offences having suffered by the
K”d”r leadership in 1981 and 1984. Therefore it made increasingly good sense to raise
the previously swollen fundamentals. In a book published by the Party press, Sárközy
(1987) discussed not only his pet idea of a Treuhand-type supraministry, but advanced
the thesis of the corporation being a socially/politically neutral form of enterprise
organisation. As this thesis remained uncontested and the author soon became the
mastermind over economic legislation, this paved the way for the massive
corporatization of Hungarian companies, two years before true privatisation was put on
the political agenda in 1990. This, of course, was a vital step to turn the unsophisticated
socialist enterprise into a subject of commercial law, and by implication, later of
commercial deals.
The earlier quoted radical reform platform of Tardos (1986) already called for the
complexity of market regulation on all commodity and factor markets alike, which
makes sense only under a predominantly private property r´gime. The capital market
and asset value maximisation are also truly capitalist institutions, especially for a
country with no real selfmanaging and third road traditions. This arrangement switched
off the heart of the socialist model: centralised investment allocation decisions. Finally
the article of Kornai (1990a) was already crystal clear in stating: if one opts for market
regulation on efficiency grounds, as the vast majority of Hungarian economics
profession did, this also implies an option for private property and capitalism.
Following the long-lasting theoretical experimentation, aimed at escaping this very
conclusion, the otherwise simple finding signalled a decisive turn in Hungarian
theorising on and policies of systemic change. Far the best survey of competing
contemporary concepts and arguments on ownership reform offered to date, by
K˛hegyi (1991), supports the view that this lengthy debate has contributed little
original and relevant to understanding either the peculiarities of Hungary, or general
laws of economics, or even the specificities of recreating the market. The debate was
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loaded with ideology, and halfway-house solutions, whose sincerity or soundness was
subject to doubt from the very outset. K˛hegyi, however was right in establishing the
lack of proprietary control (later known as corporate governance) as one of the lasting
problems saddling systemic change - an issue we`ll discuss in the next chapter of this
study.
D. Foreign trade had been the area where theory and practice were most divorced until
the turn of 80s/90s. While those working on this area normally spoke foreign
languages, travelled abroad and were much exposed to both Western theories and
practice, foreign trade remained one of the areas under tightest control. As the book of
SalgÌ (1989) documents in detail, this applied both to the screening of personnel and to
the type of political and security controls penetrating the area. On top of it, not only the
1966 NEM, but even the 1984 CCEM project contained a series of politically
motivated compromises with the traditional command economy model. This was
justified insofar as a small open economy is by definition unfit for central controls to
sustain. If embedment in the Soviet empire still made a vertically integrated and closely
controlled polity imperative, this involved a centralised foreign trade and forex system,
irrespective of its economic irrationality. Should this iron law not be observed, the
command system collapses - this could be observed in 1989-90 in Hungary. But also,
for macroplanning to make sense, a small open economy must be embedded in a
planable international environment (which was Comecon).
Therefore it is hardly surprising that both the 1966 NEM model and all of its later
editions retained a series of debilitating brakes on foreign trade and, by implication, on
the scope of market coordination both at the macro and microlevels. In part it was
justified by the unreformed Comecon mechanism. As both 1956 and the 1968 Czech
experience were indicating the limits to even theorising about leaving the bloc, this was
taken for granted in the larger half of Hungarian foreign trade. But in the theoretically
more relevant Western half, the 1966 NEM opted for the use of average rather than
marginal rate of exchange with the resultant plethora of levies and subsidies, not to
speak of continued reliance on quotas and licensing and an arbitrarily structured
customs system (operating from 1973). Monopoly of forex remained a „triviality“, and
a call for its loosening, made five years after Hungary´s IMF membership (De”k, 1987)
produced hysteric reaction from the central bank.
Under „the state of emergency“ these controls only intensified, and their loosening in
1985-87 was due to the overall erosion of central power, rather than to reforms. As
Oblath (1988) rightly emphasized, this resulted in a system of de facto multiple rates of
exchange and an overvalued currency inviting a plethora of administrative
interferences.
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This sorrowful backwardness of practices coexisted with a colourful, critical, stimu-
lating and radically progressive stream of theoretical writings, often serving as a pretext
for calling for much more radical reforms than the authorities of the day were willing to
tolerate from pieces directly accessible to them, on Hungarian domestic policy and
systemic options. This applied although authors were often quite plain in making their
points. The following highly selective overview is dictated by the imperative of self-
restraint in maintaining the overall proportions of the present survey.
The predominantly24 apologetic literature on international economics entered a new
phase by the publication of the book by B´la K”d”r (1979/84) at the turn of 1978/79,
i.e. simultaneously to the policy debacle of the decade and the resultant turn in favour
of NEM. B´la K”d”r contrasted the whole philosophy, policy and system in the
socialist world to the post-oil-crisis realities in the industrial countries. This
counterposition highlighted the multidimensionally antiquated qualities of `the most
advanced mode of production in the history of mankind`: the onesided emphasis on
heavy industries, the neglect of technology, informatics and electronics, i.e. the driving
forces in the modern age, cultivation of a societal environment positively harmful to the
most dynamic elements of international competitiveness. The world was shown to be
unipolar, with CMEA countries loosing out in their competition with developing
nations. Import substituting policies were blamed for the fiasco. K”d”r warned of the
cumulative lagging behind inherent in the structural priorities in socialist industrial
development, and aggravated by its defensive, import-restraining answer to the oil
shock.
These findings were supported and complemented by an equally path-breaking
monograph by András Köves (1980/85) on the consequences of international
embedment of socialist countries, especially Russia and Hungary. The book laid the
emphasis on the impossibility of maintaining a seclusive policy stance, despite the post-
Afghanistan animosities, highlighting the structural dependence of Russia on the West.
It highlighted the dire consequences of import-substituting policies in general and intra-
CMEA self-sufficiency grand projects in particular, blaming these for the ongoing
erosion of terms of trade, as well as for the reproduction of external financial
disequilibria.
Rounding up the theme András Inotai (1980) asked the question about the relevance of
regional groupings (finally CMEA) in the changed world economic environment. He
has found this not to be the main path of development, especially for small,
successfully adjusting and fastly growing economies. The limits of regionalism have to
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 A notable exception to the rule was the monograph of Sándor Ausch (1969/72) on Comecon, having served
for two decades as a Bible for any serious analyst. As the analytical part remained valid, it tended to be
forgotten that the author visualised a bloc of reform socialist states, as it seemed to emerge in 1966-68,
although it contradicted to elementary geopolitical realities of the Soviet empire. Books by Gy. Becsky, B.
Kádár, J. Bognár and F. Jánossy may, among other, be added.
L. Csaba: Transformation in Hungary 25
do with the emergence of global corporate networks, financial innovation and other
changes de-emphasizing historic and geographical components in the choice of
partners. Thereby the ills of the East Bloc were shown to be more fundamental than its
institutional peculiarities alone would have justified. All three books implied a call for a
radical reorientation of commercial relations from East to West.
Similar findings were derived from the financial and empirical schools already
discussed in the preceding chapter. Analysing the experience of the post-oil-crisis
period the close to official Wiesel and Wilcsek (1978, esp.46, 77, 163 and 213)
highlighted: controls on forex could not protect any economy from external stocks.
They also disproved the majority belief as if convertibility were a function of the level
of development, rather than that of liberalisation in the economic system. Analysing the
chaos in foreign trade regulation and in intrabloc trade in particular the monograph of
three financial experts (Botos, Patai and Szalkai, 1980 esp. 240-244) concluded: it was
the interest of large socialist dinosaurs which excluded any real competition to emerge.
The same consideration molded financial arrangements more than any ideology or
economic school of thought. This reproduced „socialist comparative advantage“ in
maintaining a lukewarm, but stable environment in a hectically changing world.
The point viewing autochtonous interest, not only Soviet pressure in the reproduction
of the shadow world of Comecon has had important bearings on how Hungarian
economics viewed the functioning of the economic system and available policy options.
Looking at this comfortable world Bauer (1979) concluded of the hostility of this
environment to innovation. Reflecting on this Tardos (1980b) dispelled the myth of the
350 mn strong Comecon market, as it was segmented by the bilateral trade relations,
and further split by hard and soft commodity groups. Its nature was shown to have been
hostile to the market outside of it precluding  it to serve as a training ground for
companies` entry to truly competitive markets. In another article (Tardos 1980c), he
cautioned of the disruptive consequences of financial restrictions in a nonmarket
environment, and further elaborated on the vices of Comecon stability for competitive
corporate behaviour. Namely that the monotonous growth of profits, coupled with
onesided emphasis on economies of scale, made management hostile and suspicious
against any cycles and uncertainties, inherent in the international market. Moreover,
specialised production proved often non-marketable even on Hungarian markets, not to
speak of the West.
The comfortability of environment, allowing for a non-adjustment to a changing world
was blamed for financial disequilibria by a powerful analysis of Köves and Oblath
(1983). They highlighted: there’s nothing pathological in the growth of imports from
the West, as this was the condition of any modernisation or growth to materialise. In a
different article Oblath (1980) rightly blamed the „competitive price system“ to
disorient companies more than ever by having replaced the natural relation, created by
the exchange rate between domestic and foreign prices, by an artificial prescription.
F.I.T. Discussion Paper 6/9726
Thereby it had contributed to the further proliferation of financial and administrative
arbitraryness, and rendered impossible to make any sound choice between exports and
import substitution.
This finding was supported by the monograph of S”ra P”sztor (1983) highlighting the
intimate interrelationship of autarkic tendencies, inward-looking policies and the
hierarchical structure of the economic system. She underscored the tendency to
reproduce the senile patterns by virtue of the strong interdependence among the
individual elements of a chain forming its subsystems. Thus one becomes the reason
for the other in the next run, and partial reforms are derailed. In a likeminded
monograph Csaba (1984) spoke of the dead alley of Comecon for Hungary in two
planes. First, integrational arrangements were not to be improved owing to the nature of
bureaucratic coordination. Second, the evolving crises remained covert and waked the
illusion of stability, at a time, when seeds of irrevocable decay had already been sown,
not least by the non-adjustment to the new trends in the world economy.
In a no less important debate the developmental role of foreign direct investment was
discussed. Once regional seclusion is excluded, the question of dependency arises due
to the intimate nature of multinational intracorporate division of labour. This become a
particularly hot potatoe against the background of traditional marxist hostility to
transnationals, as well as due to the dominant dependency school in the official
academe. The discussion - as summarised in Krasznai and Laki (1982) and Krasznai
(1983) rejected traditionalist fears and laid the foundations for a basically forthcoming
public attitude to FDI, as elaborated with full vigour in the habilitation theses of Inotai
(1990). This change in the general way of thinking proved quite relevant by the early
90s, turning Hungary into the only transforming country conducting a fully-fledged
open door policy vis-”-vis FDI.
In turn, Hungary could opt for a transformation strategy where foreign savings help
modernise the large industrial white elephants. Thereby it managed overcoming what a
large part of the theoretical literature view as the sole major bottle-neck in transition to
private capitalism: the lack of domestic savings that could finance privatisation. This
also may partly explain why nonconventional privatisation techniques never enjoyed
popularity among Hungarian economists, as the problem to be addressed by these was
(rightly) seen as nonexistent under Hungarian conditions. Actually, the widespread
crisis phenomena in 1978-88 helped overcome most of the misgivings against foreign
capital, and convinced the vast majority of the profession of the exigency of such
opening (or the lack of either national or regional seclusive alternatives).
This finding was reinforced by the increasingly futile attempts by the Hungarian
authorities to rely on Comecon, rather than the West, in order to avoid the painful
adjustment to new realities. This hopeless fight against realities had lead to, as Köves
L. Csaba: Transformation in Hungary 27
(1984) convincingly established, an ever growing dependence on the stagnant, ossified
Soviet markets, even more on the export side than on the side of import supplies. This
mistaken policy not only wasted a decade, but made the inevitable adjustment and
reorientation more costly than otherwise could have been.
It would have been surprising under the conditions of senile socialism, hadn’t the
ideological vigilance of the mid-80s not spilled over to the economics profession. In his
inaugural speech as a member of the Academy of Sciences, a professor of the Party
high school Hoch (1986) launched an all-out attack on the evolving mainstream of pro-
opening, calling into question the entire rationale of this option. Here, and later in a
monograph written together with his associate (Hoch and RadnÌti, 1989) he called for
an old-fashioned Keynesian growth-generating policy, based on seclusive trade
policies. He was the first to attack as „monetarists“ those who priorized market
equilibrium and a policy of opening - a terminology later commonly used, without
reference, at the other end of the political spectrum, i.e. by the populist Right.
Probably it was more the „Zeitgeist“ than the intellectual substance which explained
why these rather uninspiring ideas had triggered a stream of heated debate spread over
more than two years on the imperative of opening. Space limits us to recall only two
representative views, best formulated by the authors quoted below. A leading trade
theorist, unsurprisingly also a decisive figure in the liberal camp, produced a wittily
written critique (Nagy, 1986). Having surveyed the relevant international and
Hungarian literature he pointed to Hoch´s ignorance of these and also more recent
country evidence favouring export-led open door policies. Looking from today´s
perspective, András Nagy could be called the first „shock therapist“, three years before
Jeffrey Sachs entered the East European scene. True, Nagy refrained from such ideas as
the big leaps in institution building, so typical of true shock therapists.
The counterarguments were best advanced by Iván Szegv”ri (1988b). Also a trade
theorist by training, this author rejected the pseudo-theoretical argumentation of Hoch,
but he also contested the position of Nagy, blaming it for drawing immediate
conclusions from rather abstract theories. He elaborated the view in which it’s not the
objective (of open economy) which really matters, but the way to get there. The latter is
bound to be stepwise, via compromises. In this article Szegvári gave the full list of
arguments favouring what two years later became known as a gradualist transition
strategy.
By this time another multiyear research came to an end. As reflected in the summary
article by Richter (1989) the survey of all forms through nations traded with the Soviet
Union was conducive to a finding: only trade in convertible currencies is able to secure
Russian supplies, and only this trade régime is compatible to a free market economy.
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It is easy to see why autochtonious development in Hungarian theorising on systemic
issues, coupled with the open crisis in the external Soviet empire could produce a
breakthrough in the Hungarian trade r´gime by 1988/89. Already from January 1988 a
cautious, but by no means marginal reform, eroding foreign trade monopoly, abolishing
the separation of home and external markets and limiting discretion was underway
(N”ray, 1987). The CMEA session of October 1987 dispelled last hopes for its reform.
After 32 years in office J”nos K”d”r was demoted in May 1988. Everything was in
motion: theory and practice alike. A committee on opening up the economy was set up
as integral part of the reform commission under two deputy PMs: Rezs˛ Nyers and
Péter Medgyessy.
Thereby everything changed suddenly, basically the power structure of the party-state
and large firms, which explained why none of the reforms could really „work“ (Nagy,
1988). In a couple of months the majority view opted for a reorientation and radical
opening strategy, as part and parcel of transition to a market without adjectives
(Szamuely, ed., 1989; Köves, 1989). Calls for introducing `instant convertibility` were
made and published, prior to the political change to multiparty democracy (Nagy,
1989). Following a thorough discussion the government initiated trade in convertible
currency with Russia in March 1989, i.e. two years before the dissolution of Comecon
(for a survey of the debate and circumstances of this decision see the best survey to date
in Lányi, 1990). But over and above the theoretical deliberations, the system of trade
control simply collapsed, rendering any proposition of a „gradualist“ opening
immaterial (cf. L”nyi and SzabÌ, eds., 1993). This circumstance seems to have gone
under in that part of the Hungarian literature, which later joined Western
„Besserwisserei“ blaming the unilateral and radical nature of opening up the Hungarian
economy. In reality, the sustained policy of opening between 1989-92 proved to be one
of the few hardly contestable options, at least from the theoretical point of view, against
the background of six decades of economic seclusion. In fact, as contemporary analysis
(Köves, 1991) pointed out, there was neither political nor economic justification for the
halfway-house solutions, so strenuously cultivated by some international specialists.
The logic of collapse superimposed itself on textbookish wisdoms.
4. Transition to Capitalism
Having seen the substantive features of reforms transcending socialism, it doesn’t come
as a surprise that transition to capitalism in Hungary was smooth, both in the political
and in the economic sphere. In many ways it were economic reforms which had gone
political. The first such occasion was the much-quoted policy platform, Reform and
Turn, originating in late 1986 (Antal et al., 1987). This was the time when the new
vigilance of Party purists, busting the Writers Union, triggered the formation of the first
two opposition proto-parties, which were, at this stage, partly still overlapping.
Moreover, as the contemporary retrospective of Lengyel (1987) already documented,
there was no stringent delineation between official reformers and samizdat
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oppositionals. On the contrary: as his insider recollection unfolds at great length, even
later, when the schism between the „popular“/völkisch and urbanite opposition groups
were already deep, each had their go betweens to the highest echelons of power
(Lengyel, 1989). Thus the major conflicts emerged not between the reform socialist
government and opposition, but between various tendencies within the opposition.
Their differentiating feature was surely not a dissimilar vision of the economic stance
of the GrÌsz and N´meth governments, or even of the future economic course.
In concrete terms it meant that official, semiofficial and oppositional economic
platforms were simultaneously elaborated, often by the very same personalities, or their
closest collaborators. This ensured the lack of major twists and turns in the transition
process, in other words, the sustainability of the overall line of market transformation.
What made Reform and Turn different was its supplement III covering the societal
aspects of reforms, and supplement IV calling for a thorough overhaul in the media (i.e.
free speech). These fell typically outside the scope of narrowly economic reforms, but
the substance of the latter was rather less than more radical than that of (semi) official
reform projects. Its political message also reflected the „Zeitgeist“ that had parallely
surfaced in many other writings, partly already cited, to which we may add Bauer
(1988), Bog”r (1989), L”nyi (1985), Szamuely (1987), Voszka (1990) and probably
many others pinpointing the finalit‚ of crisis in various fields and from various
viewpoints. The real breakthrough was reached by the autumn of 1988, when
officialdom faced the sinking of the Soviet Titanic, and adopted a policy of fleeing it.
This implied trade in convertible currencies, i.e. getting out of the institutional strait-
jacket of the empire, and adoption of a reform model (T´zisek, 1988) emancipating
private property, aiming at liberalisation of trade and of factor markets. In reforming
the role of the government cessation of annual planning was envisaged, and the use of
taxation for social policy purposes was to be discontinued by the introduction of a
single rate VAT (Het´nyi, 1988b). Fiscal reform projects also covered social security
reforms. However, `K”d”rism` lasted too long, and the outgoing governments were
(rightly) feeling too fragile to address this explosive issue seriously.
The less bumpy road to enter was to take up and resolve problems where issuing new
or modified legislation didn’t trigger immediate resistance. This included a three year
programme of gradual liberalisation, and above all, the corporation law and the
transformation law, opening the gate wide to spontaneous privatisation. In this process
impersonal public property had been turned into private hands, mostly by insiders, in a
game where managers picked their owners in what was essentially an inverse
(perverse?) principal - agent relationship. The process has proceeded much quicker
than adversely effected social strata could mount effective resistance. The rationale of
the process, as explained by Matolcsy (1990) went as follows: no privatisation can be
successful against corporate management. In many ways they and the outgoing
nomenklatura were the only agents able and willing to exert proprietary functions,
combine factors, and restructure ailing companies. Decentralising losses and problems
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was an imminent task and there was no other player that could become an active agent
in mastering it. This argument relied heavily on the Hayekian concept of decentral
knowledge as a key element in societal development, while obviously serving the
capitalisation of situation rents by the old élite.
On the other hand, corporate management, even of troublemakers, tried to get along on
their own, stopped bargaining for public money, and were busy looking for various
solutions, including divestment, chopping up their company and looking for Western
strategic partners. This was only to be expected on the base of what was already known
by the late 1980s (L”nyi, 1988), i.e. Hungarian corporate bosses ceased to be clerks
taking and transmitting commands. They had evolved into independent-minded,
autonomous and very innovative business executives able to adopt into local conditions
much of what Western business economics had to offer. Interestingly, public outcries
against the process did lead to setting up the State Property Agency and the adoption of
the law on the protection of public property in May 1990, the last days of the N´meth
government. However, the new Antall government was unable either to stop
spontaneous privatisation, or to offer an alternative, or even elaborate its professional
criticism.
The latter - as different from expressions of political distaste and moral disapproval -
came rather from the „old liberal“ camp, blaming the reorganisations for not having
produced actual private property (MÌra, 1991), for not having created efficient means
of corporate control, for the lack of risking the new owners` own property (Voszka,
1991), for the neglect for clear definition of proprietary rights as well as considerations
of competition/contestable markets (Somogyi and Török, 1993). Although the Antall
government aimed at more centralised control over the process and declared as its
priority the creation of a national middle class by way of a variety of methods (A
korm”ny, 1991), reality turned out to be different. As several analysts (Voszka, 1991;
Mih”lyi, 1993) have demonstrated, the underlying spontaneity of the process, is
sociological terms the persistent dominance of corporate management vis-à-vis any
privatisation policies remained manifest all across the period of 1990-94. Various forms
of preferential schemes invariably failed. ESOP-schemes and employee-management
buyouts, conceived to impute a modicum of equity in the process, turned out to be
covert forms of leveraged management buyouts, further strengthening managerial
positions (Karsai and Wright, 1995). Various editions of a voucher programme not only
failed to elicit electoral support for the centre-right, but encountered a chilly reception
also by the profession having predicted its early demise (Major, 1994).
Various cross-country analyses therefore rightly pointed out this remarkeable stability
as a peculiarity in Hungarian transformation, where spontaneously evolving ownership
change remained predominant over all forms of social engineering, attempted by the
government in the framework of its changing privatisation policies (Major, 1993;
Mih”lyi, 1994). This was shown to be an inherent feature of transformation, as
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considerations of business are by definition at odds with any concern or concept of
social engineering, built upon a vision of an ideal society (Tömpe, 1992). Whatever is
our value judgement of this outcome, the way of ownership change has surely had a
decisive imprint on the face of Hungarian capitalism.
A further circumstance having conditioned the soft landing in capitalism was the
negotiated, gradual change in 1989-90. The reformist wing of the outgoing r´gime had
rightly seen it as a medium-term investment if it plays an initiating role in orchestrating
transition. This seemingly self-defeating policy established the moderate Left as a
lasting and professional force in the pluralist power game, whereas it levelled the
ground for a peaceful change of the guard. Therefore much of the institutional
infrastructure of pluralism, including a Constitution guaranteeing private property and
civic liberties were elaborated, and adopted on 23 Oct 1989 (i.e. on the anniversary of
the 1956 revolution). Negotiated change, meanwhile, also meant a lack of massive
cathartic feelings. The democratic government was lacking the emotional triumph cards
when it faced transition difficulties. This was a problem, insofar as their heritage was a
multidimensional crisis - of growth, of social model, of international cooperation and of
value system (K”d”r, 1990). But under the circumstances, and following the shocks of
1918, 1945 and 1956 Hungarian society was fed up with any sort of social
engineering.25 Retrospective surveys of the economic programme of democratic parties
(Laki, 1991) as well as of professional controversies (Major, 1991) proved a remarkable
consensus on this point, boiling down to the rejection of any radical proposition. The
intertwining of official and unofficial advisers also had similar effect.
This explains the mixed reception of J”nos Kornai`s new bestseller (1989), having
produced a platform of radical stabilisation cum privatisation policies. The book
summarised what we may call the mainstream of Western thinking on systemic change.
It called for radical disinflation. In so doing, it contradicted to the official reform
strategy, having stressed structural change first, foreign equilibria second, and taking a
15-20 per cent rate of inflation for normal (Berend, ed., 1990, 131-135 and 145-148).
Following the vision of his earlier writings Kornai saw enterprise behaviour and
corporate management quite unlike the microeconomic approaches surveyed above.
Therefore he saw the active role of socialist entrepreneurs much more contentious an
issue than the contemporary Hungarian professional mainstream. He was proved to be
quite right by the outcome of 1990 elections.
Meanwhile some propositions of the book produced a widespread controversy,
basically on the pages of the leading economic weekly Figyel˛. Atypically for the
Hungarian public life, a stream of critical reviews was produced, with most authors
highlighting the differences of the Hungarian realities from the reformed socialist
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 The satirical weekly in its first issue of 1990 produced a cartoon of a civilian, looking suspiciously at the
plethora of emerging new politicians, asking them „When are you going to stop finally experimenting on us,
plaese?“
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model sketched in the Free Economy. Commentators noted: it was impossible to
introduce a dual track regulation, separating public and private companies, as the
corporate and transformation laws, as well as the growth of the non-state sectors made
the dividing line between public companies, to be tightly controlled, and private
ventures, to be set free, rather ambiguous. There was also widespread disagreement
over the need to undertake a „stabilizatory operation“ as proposed by Kornai. All these
criticism notwithstanding, the Free Economy was the first open platform of fully-
fledged private capitalism26 and a call to do away with bureaucratic coordination at a
time, when most democratic parties were a long way from stating this point clearly,
whereas the outgoing administration, understandably, took an agnostic stance, that of
equality among all property forms.
Kornai`s strong antiinflationary stance („He who is for the market is against inflation“)
was also swimming against the contemporary tide seeing inflation as either a smaller
evil, or an inevitable side-effect of otherwise healthy changes. Typically for the time,
besides Kornai, only Tibor Erd˛s (1989), normally considered as too abstract for
policymakers, called into question the overall leniency on price hikes. He cautioned
against the grave dangers in surpassing the 25 per cent level of „moderate inflation“.
Contemporary editors favouring this point had to rely on a series of foreign
contributors, owing to the weak „supply response“ from the Hungarian profession.
This state of affairs prompted Kornai (1990b) to update his manifesto. Taking stock of
criticism he underscored the need for stabilisation cum reform, as well as the need to
introduce all this in a single package (791-3).27 He also reiterated his call to discontinue
spontaneous privatisation and promote personal private property holding, rather than
various forms of institutional and mixed forms of ownership.
While sharing the more abstract reasoning, as well as the objectives, of the Free
Economy, the best experts of the outgoing administration (Antal, et al., 1990) rightly
emphasized the crucial policy role of liberalisation and deregulation for the market
order to evolve. Their other group (V´rtes and Kardos, 1990) were rightly blaming the
stalemate, due to ossified interest structures, for the lack of a breakthrough of a similar
platform in 1987-89. But this situation has fundamentally changed by the collapse of
the party-state in Hungary in 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union
two years later. Precisely their intertwining with the old power structures left the most
powerful lobbies vulnerable and allowed for a twin policy of liberalisation and stringent
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 Normally, this is seen as the conditio sine qua non of shock therapy, and this was the (implicit) view of the
contemporary profession in Hungary. Meanwhile, in a characteristic outbrust, Balcerowicz (1995, 195-200)
singles out Kornai for proving the dangers inherent in an evolutionary (gradualist) approach. Both reactions
show, in my view, how misperceived the entire gradualism versus shock therapy debate was.
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monetary and fiscal stance to sustain. This happened amongst administrative and
ideological chaos, conducted by a government, having adopted an outright dirigiste
ideological stance (Csaba, 1992).
But at the time of the first democratically elected government`s accession to power the
situation wasn’t as clear as yet. The Democratic Forum - and on occasion, some other
forces - adopted the slogan of social market economy, without being specific about it,
even without having a clear conceptual clarification of this objective.28 For the HDF it
did not mean a primarily liberal philosophy and a priority of „Ordnungspolitik“, but by
and large, rejection of the idea of shock therapy and of American-type Wild-West
capitalism. The need to rely on something prestigious and proven (i.e. marketable for a
conservative electorate) had to do with the two front fight of the new Premier, JÌzsef
Antall. On the one hand he felt the need to dissociate himself from the policy
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission (Berend-Bollobás, et al., 1990),
whose suggestions, starting from elected sheriffs to strong municipal administration,
thus sounded much like the platform of the second strongest party, and his main
contender, the AFD. On the other hand, he equally had to dissociate himself from the
original third-road/market socialist platform of his own party’s Lakitelek Manifesto of
1987, which was clearly out of date under the new conditions and unfit as a government
platform. What he could have most relied on, the suggestions of the Bridge Group
(HID, 1990) was not economic philosophy but sheer pragmatism, calls to continue
basically liberal economic policies and to lauch reform of public finances as soon as
possible.
All these theories have exerted a rather limited impact on policy-making. Formation of
the government proved intricate and inconclusive, as no solid new majority emerged.
Finally, a separate deal with the major opposition force enabled Antall to marginalise
his more radical coalition partners, however at the cost of perpetuating infights within
his own team, rendering any major policy reform next to impossible. The unfortunate
attempt by finance minister Ferenc Rab”r, a political newcomer, to abolish all subsidies
at one stroke triggered the taxi drivers` blockade, the only major civic unrest ever since.
This has taken place a mere five months after the formation of the new government.
The lethal illness of the PM also became public at that time.
These circumstances were clearly hostile to social engineering of any sort, and
convinced the government to step in the footprint of its predecessor. This happened by
the adoption of a three year economic programme (H”rom´ves ... 1990) containing only
a third of the original (August) subsidy cuts. The programme clearly rejected
reprivatisation, the single issue of the governing smallholders, called for full
liberalisation of wages and exports, and in an obscure language, basically postponed all
                                                          
28
 Proving this point in a survey of contemporary literature Lányi (1996) shows the predominance of
secondary accounts by outsiders over the original German theorists, as well as the strong political
instrumentalisation of this concept.
F.I.T. Discussion Paper 6/9734
measures that could cover, even in part, social security reforms. The ministry of finance
project remained silent on the politically most explosive issues, like the Gab`ikovo
Dam, the world exhibition, ways to tackle poverty and massive unemployment,
privatisation, writing off inherited debts of commercial banks (or alternative ways to
consolidate banks)29, restructuring the government itself and particularly its chaotic
finances. Whereas contemporary critiques focussed on the quantitative forecasts, which
were uncertain anyway, or approached it in purely political terms, Ill´s (1991) called
attention to the lack of priorities, which was a heritage from the 80s. Interestingly,
when the new finance minister Mih”ly Kupa, the founding father of the 1987 tax
reform took over, under his auspices basically the same programme survived. The only
meaningful difference was that in the final edition (Stabiliz”ciÌ ... 1991) legislative
measures aimed at institution building have come to the fore, whereas the quantitative
aspect figured only in the supplement.
This change of emphasis was quite in line with Hungarian mainstream thinking, and
was also right in view of major uncertainties underlying basic data, having rendered
modelling an extremely high risk business. However, given the lasting intra-coalition
stalemate, the new emphasis could not be translated into practice. The latter continued
to be molded by muddling through and improvisation, which wasn’t really surprising. If
one were to take the economic discourse of the political class and the contemporary
daily press at face value (which would, of course, be misleading) one could describe
this also as a policy of „Schadenbegrenzung“, of minimising losses, that could have
occurred from, poorly thought out radical initiatives of various sorts. Contemporary
observers, sympathetic to the difficulties, were rightly stressing the lack of strategy as a
main deficiency: only such vision could have transformed the policy of muddling
through into a truly gradualist stance (Mizsei, 1993). The latter would have meant a
conceptually well established privatisation and market building strategy. Meanwhile it
would have required giving up the purely politically motivated initiatives in
nonconventional economics, as the artificial lowering the rate of interest, restitution,
the world exhibition project, debtor consolidation (bailout of large industrial firms) and
reorganisation programmes, all originating in the parliamentary caucus or in the various
(semi)official `expert` groups. Worst of it was, of course, the artificial growth
acceleration drive (V´rtes, 1992), which laid behind the arbitrary interest rate policies
of the Bank in 1991-93, and translated into 8 bn $ current account deficit in 1993-94
(against merchandise exports of 8.1 and 10.1 bn $, respectively).
It is interesting to observe the ongoing decoupling of professional debates from
political polarisation. This produced a fairly unique situation for Hungary, where
political groups and economic schools hardly overlap. This feature has become
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manifest since the July 1994 formation of the centre-left government. The latter`s
backbone, the Socialists adopted a basically neoliberal stance in line with OECD
practices. Meanwhile, not only the populist, but also the moderate Right continue to go
out their ways to protect the remnants of the socialist welfare state.30
This incongruity surely counts among the peculiarities of the Hungarian intellectual
landscape. But it is remarkeable, that a multiauthor volume, giving a cross-professional
overview of how Hungarian economists viewed the transition phase of 1988-92
(Sz´kely and Newbery, eds., 1993), still testified about a „Grundkonsens“ in all major
issues. The true - new - differences emerged not in seeing this, but in the subsequent
phase, when such questions emerged as to what capitalism, through what way, at what
price? This will be the subject of the following chapter of this study. The general
professional agreement was reflected in public opinion`s wide approval of instituting
central bank independence in 1990, of introducing West European accounting practices
both at macro and microlevels in 1992, of the forthcoming attitude to FDI, of
privatisation to be run `British style` rather than via populist free distribution schemes,
and last but not least, on trade reorientation and Hungary`s accession to the EU (with
the official application handed in April, 1994).
No serious analyst has ever questioned the substance of any of these steps. Those
sounding critical voices disagree with particular techniques, timing or coordination
among these measures, rather than with their overall rationale. This reflects, after all, a
remarkeable consensus in a country where political groups hardly agree upon anything
except the national anthem and maintenance of a pluralist system (based on free
elections and private property). The accession of Hungary to the OECD in March 1996
was an external reassurance of Hungary`s having crossed the threshold of transition
phase between socialism and capitalism. It is therefore unsurprising, if the more
difficult questions of what capitalism` have come to the fore. This gave birth to and
rebirth of schools of thought typical of established democracies.
5. Which Capitalism? The (Re) birth of Currents in Economics
It would be quite absurd to conclude this survey with offering one particular vision of
the target model as derived from and substantiated by Science. Following the collapse
of the „only scientific worldview“ all what we can present is a sketch of approaches
and currents having emerged from historic development as well as from interaction
with the international community. As any survey of contemporary output, this one may
well look arbitrary to some, and not everybody will rejoice seeing himself grouped with
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particular persons. Some areas will undoubtedly feel underrepresented if only due to
limitations of space and of subject, as delineated in the Introduction. Similar attempts,
with a due historic perspective, will serve right to each and correct the errors inherent
in any first run. For brevity’s sake we shall group and label authors as it corresponds,
by and large, to Western parlance and conventions, and shall avoid semantic debates on
the vices and virtues of the latter, thus shall disregard self-categorization of the authors
themselves.
The nature of the transitory phase was such, that the maxims of the neoliberalism
couldn’t but dominate the scene. With the time passing, an ever growing number of
authors started to ask about the price to be paid for the free economy in terms of output,
employment and human conditions in general (see e.g. most recently Szamuely, 1996a).
Obviously under the strong influence of the Economic Commission of Europe, analyses
assessing transition costs as too high were elaborated. Consequently, calls for an
anticrisis, growth-generating policy, laying more emphasis on the social component of
change have emerged. And this is, at least in immediate policy terms, what
Keynesianism has been all about. Of course, this line of thought, in view of its decades-
long experience, developed in two main directions. Whereas the more orthodox version
is still in favour of expansionary governmental policies and controls, the modern
version takes stock of the multitude of dangers inherent in inflationary policies.
Old-fashioned Keynesianism didn’t need to be reinvested, since this current has always
been around, as our quoting the Hoch and RadnÌti (1989) book already illustrated.
Riding on the tide of dissatisfaction, the impressive public speaker Kop”tsy (1992) was
the first to launch an all-out attack on `idolizing` antiinflationary concerns at the cost of
everything else. In another article (1993) he blamed the entire mistaken concept of
`monetarism` for what he considered as a dead alley for the Hungarian economy.
Others also advocated expansionary policies on theoretical grounds as the right way to
get out of `depression` (Mandel and Szombathelyi, 1995). Yet others advocate tax and
rate cuts, market protection and the positive stimulation of domestic markets to
generate more growth and income (Matolcsy and Kopátsy, 1995). Still others draw
attention to a general 20th century experience proving the inefficiency of free marketeer
policies on the peripheries of the world economy (Berend, 1995).
This line of thought is joined by an influental segment of agricultural economics.
Rom”ny (1992) went as far as calling for a specific Hungarian way asking, if this was
possible under the Soviet empire, why shouldn’t it be feasible against the EU? Still
others highlighted the inherent constraints to introducing a predominantly private
farming under Hungarian conditions and called for support to corporatized large coops
and state farms (Varga, Gy. 1993). He highlighted: the rural population can`t relaunch
private farming unless massive state aids are granted.
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The more modern version of Keynesianism appreciates the grave dangers of fiscal
overspending and of sustaining inflation. It tries to integrate deficit cuts to the objective
of avoiding a credit crunch (Erd˛s, 1992), appreciates the existence of crowding out, as
an objective phenomenon dangerous to any recovery (Erd˛s, 1993, 18-22.), and
underlines: fiscal expansion, on its own, is counterproductive; it is the rate of
investments which need to be augmented (Erd˛s, 1994). The middle of the road
position also means adherence to Keynesian principles, why giving way to concerns of
fiscal equilibria (Veress, ed., 1993).
A milestone of the revival of this approach was the monograph of Köves (1992)
highlighting the loss of output and employment as the single most important feature
(and also a crisis sign) of economic transformation regionwide. This approach
developed into tolerating selective discretionary and administrative tools as anti-
depression means (Köves, 1994, 15-6) and the rejection of the aspiration to remodel the
welfare state over and above inevitable fiscal corrections (Köves, 1995, 41-3;
Augusztinovics, 1996). Interestingly, in a retrospective analyses, justifying the artificial
interest rate cuts of 1991-93, the former governor of the central bank came to a similar
conclusion in a rightist conservative monthly (Bod, 1995), which illustrates our earlier
point of incongruence between economic and political affiliations.31 This line of
thought rejects the concept of twin deficits, and finds therefore unjustified to curtail
domestic consumption in order to improve the current account (Oblath, 1995).
The neoliberal camp in Hungary is certainly more institutionalist than monetarist,
which would sound as odd in Britain or in the United States. But this orientation has to
do with the nature of transformation, which is, to a great extent, about institution
building. In so doing Kornai (1992) was among the first in the international transition
debate who called attention to the time dimension of the change, normally
underestimated by the early radical approaches as well as by orthodox neoclassicals. He
was the first to draw the conclusion on the inevitability of lasting fiscal deficits in the
course of transformations,32 as expenditure cuts were imminent, whereas the recovery
of governmental revenue is also certingent upon recovery of economic activity, which
did take time. One of the structural reasons for the reproduction of deficits is the early-
born/overextended welfare state, which bears no relation to actual economic
performance in postsocialist countries.
Addressing the problem of recession this approach stresses dissimilarities of the fall of
output in the post-Soviet era from cyclical slumps and even depressions in the West. In
an influential article Kornai (1993) listed a series of factors having conditioned a
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transformational recession which is partly structural, partly due to hardening the budget
constraints and reorientation, as well as to market exits. In other words, these all reflect
fundamentally healthy processes rather than a crisis.
The neoliberal camp, understandely, conducted an all-out war on the centralisation
tendencies emerging under various governments in the name of a variety of ideologies.
In a critical book Sárközy (1994) contrasted the surface of legal form, having
approximated to EU standards, with legislative practice and also sectoral regulations of
various sorts, which reflect bureaucratic narrow-mindedness. L”nyi (1995) also
criticised the lack of deregulation both as a theoretical guideline and a policy issue, as
overregulation lames enterpreneurship more than taxation or recession. Attempts by the
government to centralise control over privatisation was compared to planning, and to
state property holding company to the old planning bureaucracy (Karsai, G. 1993).
Others ridiculed initiatives to orchestrate industrial policies as attempts by a super-
fluous bureaucracy to regain its lost raison d`être (Csillag, 1992). In a very successful
monograph, ¢va Voszka (1995) described the political and bureaucratic foot-dragging
that evolved in the privatisation agencies in their fight against financial organs and
sectoral ministries, aggravated by their internal divisions. By contrast, as Judit Karsai
(1994) explains, industrial reorganisation programmes were thinly veiled attempts by
the bureaucracy and management of ailing firms to postpone privatisation and later
avoid it altogether.
In a similar vein, while officials even retroactively justify ways and means of bank
consolidation, i.e. a centralised bailout operation on grounds that are familiar from
international banking literature (Balassa, 1996), the neo-liberal camp remains very
critical of the moral hazard, of bureaucratic arbitraryess and the very lavish use of
taxpayers` (in larger part, `future governations`) money in saving on open fiscal
commitments (Kir”ly, 1994; Köbli, 1994). They, as well as V”rhegyi (1995a) criticise
the sustaining lack of businesslike behaviour and miss competition, a circumstance they
blame for the malfunctions. Meanwhile the official view justifies interventions on
grounds of overall bank safety and protecting savings of the population.
Interestingly, following the change of government in 1994 the neoliberal camp
remained in professional opposition, i.e. in disagreement with the style and substance
of governmental practices. The government was criticised for acting bureaucratically,
in the atmosphere of favouritism and campaign, rather then let privatisation evolve
following the business considerations and ensure transparency (Csillag, 1995).
Paradoxically, the great Christmas sale of 1995 only reinforced the validity of this
point.
Official reform endeavours have highlighted the need to centralise public finances,
which implied taking back most freedoms devolved to lower level institutions of civil
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service in 1980-86 (PM, 1994) by setting up the Treasury Office.33 Meanwhile, the
neoliberal camp sounded alarm (Egri, 1995; V”rhegyi, 1995b) cautioning against
recreating the omnipotent fiscal bureaucracy of the 1970s. Two more subject figure
high on the neoliberal agenda. First, attempts are made to build a bridge to the
mainstream and operationalise its findings into Hungarian conditions. The monograph
of Pete (1996) is the first comprehensive attempt to perform this function at the level of
economic theory, while Csaba (1995b) is a similar attempt to interpret the
OECD/Washington consensus at the level of theory of economic policy.
Second, as fiscal reforms greatly overlays with social security reform and the
concomitant rewriting of the social contract, this long postponed issue came to the for.
The monograph of L”szlÌ (1994) addresses this point basically from the organisational
perspective. He follows a logic of fiscal streamlining, and calls for a much smaller but
vastly more efficient public sector in providing welfare services. Reacting on the
hysterically rejective public mood, triggered by the first such attempts, Kornai
published two major articles on this issue. In one (1996) he discusses fiscal cuts in
terms of paternalism versus growing freedom of choice, a point that has completely
gone under in public perceptions. In a related, more comprehensive account (1995/96)
he asks about the limits to consensual change in a myopic society. The piece quite
bluntly states some of the practical tradeoffs that are hard to reconcile within a liberal
worldview anyway. Presenting a more formal (standard Western) way of argumentation
Csontos (1995) calls into attention the fiscal illusions misleading the public in more
egalitarian systems, where implicit costs/debts as well as future burdens remain
regularly covert and systematically underestimated. This awakes a public misperception
viewing reforms, bringing these choices/tradeoffs open, as a frontal attack on remnants
of social justice.34
There are yet other trends of thought which do not fit easily to the conventional
dichotomy. The libertinian „group“ consists of analysts distancing themselves from
both „established“ trends from a point of strong anti-etatism while emphasising
human/civic concerns. The `school` consists of individuals normally not very
intensively interchanging with, or even reflecting on, one another. BrÌdy (1992) was
probably the first to revolt against the property myth, as having lead to centralised
procedures, and his (1994) article declared a crusade on the modernisation monopoly of
the state. This approach has had at least a decade old prehistory with (BrÌdy, 1986)
blaming oversize defense expenditures for basically all economic (structural, strategic
and systemic) distortions in the post-1929 period. In a sophisticated article L”nyi
(1994/95) blamed transformation to have given in to the predominant concerns of
globalised financial markets, while neglecting the ongoing marginalisation suffered by
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the majority of mankind, and putting up with the disregard for basic human concerns
(as production, sale, consumption, dwelling). For his part, Kov”cs (1994) blamed the
neoliberal camp of hidden authoritarian tendencies precisely because of its institu-
tionalist leanings.
Though its level of abstraction leads it outside the scope of the present analysis,
mention should be made of the strong Hungarian mainstream,35 presenting its output
chiefly in international journals, besides Szigma (in Hungarian) and Economic Systems
Research (a Carfax publication, edited by A. BrÌdy)˘ . This line of analysis is
understandably strong in the exchange rate thory (Halpern, 1989; Halpern and
Wyplosz, 1995), in modelling the pension system (Simonovits, 1994) as well as in the
stabilisation theory (Valentiny, 1992 and 1995; Halpern, 1991), to name but a few of
the policy relevant subjects. Findings of the formalised approaches are understandably
often at odds with those of the more intuitive and down-to-earth neoliberal camp,
where philosophycally most of the mainstream contributors would belong. This school
is quickly growing by the involvement of the youngest generations, having had their
basic training in this direction. While this survey is extremely selective, the relatively
old quotations also indicate: Hungarian mathematical economics has developed organic
relations to the mainstream well before political changes occurred.
Mention should be made of transformation studies, which are not at all as numerous as
one could have expected from a pioneering reform country. This has to do with the
severe bloodletting of the profession: prime politics, the state administration, foreign
academic positions and even business distracted people who could, in theory, have
contributed.36 Many of the relevant output was already quoted in one way or another.
The survey of Szamuely (1992) highlighted the difficulty of giving birth to a new area,
and foreshadowed the dilemmas of future, which, indeed, have become the watershed
between various professional schools.
K”d”r (1994) highlighted the need for redefinition of the role of the state from the
perspective of internationalisation, growth promotion and organising the catch-up
potential. Greskovits (1993 and 1995) made pioneering work in the light of new
comparative political economy, trying to understand the interaction of economic and
policy factors in ensuring social acceptance of radical marketeer reforms. He
highlighted the limits to spontaneous protests and wild social explosions in countries
where tripartite coordination of interest, parliamentarism, the rule of law and media
formation of public perceptions support governmental compensation of the worst
losers. Finally the book of Csaba (1995) singles out financial intermediation and
competition, rather than the property and the growth issue as the backbone of systemic
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change. His book is a pladoyer for the gradual withering away or this special area as the
fundamental qualities of market order will crystallize. He also calls for a better
application of available standard economics on the specific Eastern field, than was the
case in the `first generation` transitology.
Finally mention should be made of agricultural economics and foreign trade studies,
two specialised areas that don`t really fit into our categories of „schools“. Still, these
have produced interesting insights into the nature of economic change in Hungary. The
book of Cs”ki and Rab”r (1990, 210-240) was the first comprehensive analysis calling
for a rethinking of the previous strategies based on fostering the volume of sales
abroad. They highlighted the market limits to this approach why calling for an
ecologically oriented, quality-sensitive policy. Sipos and Halmai (1993) made a strong
case against simplistic approaches blaming both command and free marketeer
dogmatism for neglecting salient features of the area. In a similar vein, L”nyi and Fertö
(1993) cautioned against overplaying the property issue in this area, as societal vision,
cultural considerations, regional concerns and respect for social stability also play a role
in making public choices. Finally the textbook of Halmai (1996) offers a survey of the
type of radical changes this area is to undergo in the course of Hungarian accession to
the EU.
This brings us to the foreign trade area, where many new issues emerge under the new
perspective of EU accession. Not attempting the impossible, we constrain ourselves to
mention the programmatic article of Inotai (1995) on the offensive, and the monograph
of Török (1996) on the defensive side. The comprehensive monograph of Bal”zs (1996)
is an attempt to integrate both sides. The joint article by Inotai and Pal”nkai (1994)
offers an insight into the outcomes of a multiauthor multiyear analysis, serving as a
backbone to the left-liberal government`s accession strategy - maybe, raising too high
expectations in terms of what the EU is up to for integrating Central Europe.37
6. Conclusions and Prospects
This bird’s eye view on the currents and subjects is far from being exhaustive. We
consciously omitted methodological studies, nonconventional approaches (as on the
very long cycles) and border areas, besides sectoral economics. What we hoped to
convey was a message of the manifest diversity of both approaches and interests.
Plurality in both areas can probably be taken as the best indicator of return to European
normalcy. As seen from the survey of individual areas, traditional eclecticism is still
strongly present. The emergence of formalised approaches, as well as the crystallisation
in the schools of thought will certainly exert a disciplining influence and diminish this
feature. Immediate influences of international trends are hard to establish except for the
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by definition international formalised areas. However, with the transition phase over,
the type of reforms yet to be undertaken, in areas like social security or farming, the
similar nature of problems to be solved will surely enhance the direct interaction with
economics and economic policies of OECD countries. Thus a further approximation to
this „normalcy“ will be a salient feature in the long-term intellectual development of
the years to come, at the expense of esoteric and „alternative“ approaches. The latter,
will surely encounter a revival in those postsocialist countries where transformation has
widely been seen as a major debacle and an unnecessary nuisance by the majority of the
public - and of the profession alike.
Meanwhile, the specific features will hardly disappear from the whole of Hungarian
economics. The presence of a strong empirical-sociological approach in micro-
economics and surveys of enterprise behaviour will surely be one of those features.
Given the limits to agricultural protection - owing to new WTO rules and financial
constraints - agricultural economics will probably be more inclined to free market
ideas, than in most of the EU outside the U.K. The article of Fert˛ (1996), questioning
the validity of most „theoretical“ arguments invoked for protecting farming as a special
activity is a first sign of this trend. As empirical surveys have already evidenced a
gradual breakthrough of market conforming behaviour in the traditionally overregulated
food industry (Moh”csi, 1996), this time theory and practice may well go hand in hand.
Neo-institutionalism will hardly give way to pure forms of neoclassical or monetarist
approaches. If for no other reasons, because of a decade-long process of adopting the
acquis communautaire as well as the upbringing and personal interest of the older and
middle aged opinion-molders will vouch warranty for this phenomenon to last. The
growing distance between policymakers` and theorist`s view of the economy will surely
continue to seduce leading academics to policy relevant issues and analyses of policy
failures, just as much as one can observe this in The Economic Journal, The American
Economic Review or The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Following the fiscal
reforms, the Hungarian academe will also not be affluent enough to afford the
aristocratism of pure theories, currently dominating the leading economics departments
of the globe. But, after all, is it going to be a great disadvantage to the country and to
the discipline? Only time will tell it.
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